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CONSUMER-PRODUCER COLLUSION AND RELATED POLICY
RISKS FOR CONSUMER-FACING REGULATION
Nathan Richardson*

Abstract

Used a gas can recently? If not, prepare for a
surprise—they’ve become harder to use due to
government-mandated design changes aimed at
reducing air pollution. Faced with persistent
environmental and other challenges, government
regulators have increasingly turned to similar
regulations on consumer products. But these
consumer-facing regulations create new policy and
political problems for regulators, different from
those associated with traditional industry-facing
regulation. This paper looks in depth at three case
studies of consumer-facing regulation: emissions
controls on gas cans, efficiency standards for light
bulbs, and European vehicle fuel economy
standards. In each case, there is strong evidence
for widespread evasion of the regulations by
consumers and by consumers and producers
working together. This evasion may substantially
undercut the targeted benefits of the regulations.
Moreover, consumer dissatisfaction with the
regulations appears common, perhaps indicating
underappreciated costs to consumers and playing
in to anti-regulatory narratives. Building on these
case studies, this paper explores options available
to regulators for reducing incentives and
opportunities to evade consumer-facing regulation
and for anticipating or reducing consumer
dissatisfaction. Such options include externality
pricing, stricter (and smarter) enforcement, careful
selection of regulatory targets, modifications to exante cost-benefit analysis, and, in some cases,
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eschewing regulation entirely in favor of providing
information or other less-intrusive policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When was the last time you used a gasoline can? If it was more than a
few years ago, or more recently but the can you used was more than a
few years old, the experience was likely simple and straightforward.
Open the spout; open a vent at the back of the can so a vacuum does not
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form; and pour away. This simple design has been used in gas
containers for decades, and for liquid containers of all types for far
longer. But if you use a gas can sold in the US today, you will likely
have a much more frustrating experience. New cans have no vents and
usually require two-handed operation of a relatively complex (usually
spring-loaded) spout mechanism. They take longer to pour and have a
learning curve—it is quite likely that you will pour nothing at all and/or
spill some gasoline until you get the hang of it.
Why the design change? Why fix something that is not obviously
broken? The answer is that the new designs do have an important
advantage (or, conversely, that the old design was in a sense broken) in
a way that is not immediately apparent. Moreover, the changes are only
partially for your (the gas can user’s) benefit. The key advantage is that
new cans lose much less gasoline to evaporation (at least assuming you
do not spill while pouring). With no vents to leave open and autoclosing spouts, you will never come to find that the contents of a can
you have not used in months and absentmindedly left open have
evaporated. Moreover, you and everyone in your area will breathe a
little easier—evaporating gasoline releases volatile organic carbons
(VOCs) (including benzene) and other pollutants 1 that can cause or
exacerbate serious health problems. 2
Environmental regulators, recognizing this opportunity to reduce
emissions, have mandated that new gas cans meet standards that
effectively ban old-style vented cans, first in California and later at the
federal level. 3 These regulators have concluded that the public health
benefits of the new cans outweigh their increased sticker price and
added frustration. They may be correct. But if you are tempted to just
keep your old can, buy one at a garage sale, or even take a drill to a new
can to (damn the regulators) add the vent that God intended a gas can to
have—you are not alone. These and other creative methods of
regulatory evasion, some in concert with manufacturers, have become
common. So too has popular backlash against the regulations, at least
among those who use gas cans frequently, likely contributing to loss of
confidence in environmental regulators specifically and possibly

1. See Assessment and Standards Division, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, EPA,
Estimating Emissions Associated with Portable Fuel Containers (PFCs) at 1 (2007),
http://goo.gl/hrQxpN (estimating pollutant emissions from PFCs).
2. See also Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 8428,
8428-8430 (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter “EPA PFC Rule”] (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 59, subpt. F) (noting
that “benzene is a known human carcinogen” and that VOCs are “precursors to ozone and PM2.5”, both
of which are regulated under National Ambient Air Quality Standards).
3. See Regulations: Portable Fuel Containers and Spouts, Final Regulation Order (2000),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/spillcon/finalreg.pdf (initial gas can emissions rules for California)
[hereinafter “1999 CARB PFC Rule”]; see also EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2.
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government generally. Moreover, regulators appear not to have
adequately considered the degree of creative regulatory evasion or
political pushback when they decided to regulate can design. This story
of the gas can’s regulatory undoing is one example of a wider
phenomenon of evasion and backlash against consumer-facing
regulations.
Most regulatory laws, including but not limited to environmental
laws, are generally understood as restricting the ability of a small group
of relatively powerful actors to do things (pollution, overexploitation of
resources, marketing of unsafe drugs, etc.) that harm the general
welfare. Put in economic terms, regulation limits the ability of
producing firms to impose external costs on consumers/everyone, at
least in principle. Or in colloquial terms, regulations keep the big guys
from hurting everyone else (perhaps especially from hurting the little
guys). Of course, regulations may or may not be effective in practice.
They impose costs on the firms, industries, and activities to which they
apply, and these costs are eventually passed on to consumers.
Regulations also have administrative costs paid for by tax revenues. If
these costs together are greater than the benefits of the regulation, then it
has failed—the cure is worse than the disease. As some economists and
regulators (and all environmental justice advocates) note, distributional
impacts of a regulation should also be considered in judging its
effectiveness.
While this abstract model of regulation works well in many contexts,
it is incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. Not all regulation applies to
large producing firms, and not all costs imposed on consumers or the
general public come in the form of higher prices for goods and services.
Sometimes regulations apply to consumers directly, by restricting
consumer choice, or indirectly, by making the products consumers use
work less well for their intended purpose.
These direct effects on consumers do not mean that such regulations
are not justified—benefits may still exceed costs, sometimes greatly.
However, the politics and policy analyses are different. Under the
“classical” view of regulation, regulated firms may oppose regulation ex
ante or try to evade compliance ex post, but the general consuming
public is the beneficiary of that regulation and will support it, at least so
long as the public believes that the benefits they receive exceed the costs
passed on to them. This analysis changes, however, when regulations
impose private costs directly on consumers. Consumers who cannot buy
the product they want because regulation has banned its sale, or who
find that regulated products perform poorly in comparison to the
unregulated products they used in the past, face private costs that may
feel more real and immediate than increased costs passed on by
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regulated firms do. Cost-benefit analysis of regulations may also fail to
fully account for relatively hard-to-measure lost consumer welfare due
to reduced choice or lower performance, making regulations seem more
beneficial on net than they really are.
These effects may lead consumers themselves to attempt to avoid
regulations, behaving more like regulated producers. Opposition to
regulation may increase, undercutting regulators’ “social license to
regulate.” Consumers and producers may even collude to avoid
regulation, capturing and dividing private benefits at the cost of greater
externalities imposed on the general public. In other words, both
political support and practical effectiveness of regulation may drop.
Policymakers should be aware of these risks and account for them in
regulatory design (and in decisions regarding whether to regulate at all).
To be clear, attempts to evade regulation are neither new nor limited
to the consumer-facing regulation discussed here. Because the
distribution of costs and benefits from any regulation will not be
uniform, it is possible, and indeed likely, that some groups or
individuals will oppose regulations that (at least ostensibly) enhance
social welfare but which they feel impose excessive private costs on
them. This opposition may come in the form of lobbying or other rentseeking behavior, or regulated parties may take matters into their own
hands and attempt to evade the regulations (or, more pejoratively and
precisely, to cheat).
This paper examines three case studies of consumer regulatory
evasion, some of which appear to involve collusion between producers
and consumers. As the case studies and subsequent discussion illustrate,
evasion appears more frequent in the consumer context. This evasion
can be significant—in one of the three case studies, it appears that as
much as 65% of ostensible benefits of the regulation were never realized
due to evasion. 4 Moreover, consumer-facing regulation appears to
generate much greater consumer discontent than regulation that merely
increases costs, even though those costs are eventually passed on to
consumers.
These case studies therefore suggest that regulators should more
honestly and deeply consider the additional administrative, economic,
and political costs of consumer-facing regulation. Discussion after the
case studies suggests a number of possible regulatory responses.

4. See Mathias Reynaert and James M. Sallee, Self Regulation, Corrective Policy, and
Goodhart’s Law: The Case of Carbon Emissions From Automobiles 3 (NBER, Working Paper No.
22911, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22911.pdf [hereinafter Reynaert & Sallee].
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II. REGULATING GAS CAN EMISSIONS
Millions of Americans use portable gasoline cans to store spare fuel
for cars, boats, yard tools, generators, and other vehicles and devices.
The (usually red) gas can has been a fixture of American households for
over a century—everyone has seen one, many households have one, and
some have many. While designs varied, from the iconic rectangular
military-spec “jerry can” to the common round steel container found in
many garages, their basic function was similar. Most cans were sealed
with two caps, one large and one small, and pouring fuel required
opening both. Remove the larger cap and screw on a spout, then open
the small cap and pour. The small cap allows air to enter the can as fuel
is poured out, preventing uneven pours and spills (see Figure 1). If you
have never used a gas can, imagine pouring a milk or water jug into the
sink. You are likely to get a sloppy, gurgling pour—that is, unless you
poke a small hole in the bottom of the jug before pouring. Doing so
allows air pressure to equalize behind the liquid being poured from the
jug. The small vent on a gas can plays the same role.

Figure 1: Pre-regulation gas cans. Note primary opening for attaching spout
and secondary (open) vent.5
5. Image source: Washington & Jefferson College Culturally Authentic Pictorial Lexicon (CCnoncommercial license).
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This basic design worked quite well, though it did have flaws.
Inexperienced users could spill gas when pouring, for example by not
securely attaching the spout or failing to open the vent. If either cap was
left off when the can was stored, gasoline would evaporate at a
surprisingly rapid rate.6 Some materials used for cans were also
permeable to gasoline vapors over time. 7 All of these potential problems
have obvious negative effects on those who buy and use the cans.
Spilling gasoline or allowing it to evaporate is wasteful, and spills of
such a highly flammable liquid can create a major safety hazard.
A. The Gas Can Emissions Problem and Regulatory Response
The negative effects of gasoline spills and evaporation are not limited
to the consumers/users of gas cans, however. Evaporating gasoline is a
significant air pollutant. When gasoline evaporates, it contributes VOCs
to the air, including toluene, butane, and benzene. 8 Some of these
compounds, such as benzene, are themselves toxic. 9 VOCs also
contribute to formation of tropospheric ozone and fine particulate matter
(PM 2.5), both of which have significant negative health effects. 10 Both
ozone and PM 2.5 are regulated under the Clean Air Act as “criteria”
pollutants subject to national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), 11
which states are required to meet under the Clean Air Act. 12
Atmospheric VOCs, ozone, and PM 2.5 levels depend on emissions
from a variety of sources, including vehicle tailpipes and industrial
processes, 13 among which evaporating gasoline is a small but not trivial
contributor.14 Spilled gasoline can also contaminate ground and surface
water. In economic terms, therefore, spills and evaporation from gas
cans impose both a private cost to can users (wasted gasoline) and a

6. See Estimating Emissions Associated with Portable Fuel Containers, supra note 1 at 11
(noting that CARB research estimated that 49% of PFCs in commercial use and 34% of those in
residential use were stored in the “open” position).
7. See id. at 6 (estimating permeation rates for plastic and metal PFCs).
8. See id. See also Jo-Yu Chin and Stuart A. Batterman, VOC composition of current motor
vehicle fuels and vapors, and collinearity analyses for receptor modeling, 86 CHEMOSPHERE 951 (2012)
(detailing VOC composition of retail gasoline).
9. See EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2 at 8428 (noting that “benzene is a known human
carcinogen”).
10. See id. at 8430.
11. Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006).
13. See EPA, Report on the Environment, Volatile Organic Compounds Emissions, available at
https://cfpub.epa.gov/roe/indicator.cfm?i=23 (describing VOCs as precursor of ozone and PM
emissions).
14. See Estimating Emissions Associated with Portable Fuel Containers, supra note 1 at 10
(estimating 327,000 tons of hydrocarbon emissions from PFCs in 2005).
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public cost or negative externality to everyone in the area (air pollution).
Gas cans, as consumer products, have long been subject to some level
of regulation. For example, many states require gas cans to be red for
safety reasons. 15 But until recently the basic design of gas cans was not a
subject of any significant regulation. Beginning in 1999, however,
regulators began to take interest in gas cans (portable fuel containers, or
PFCs in regulatory parlance) because of the contribution of gasoline
evaporation to air pollution. 16 The California Air Resources Board
(CARB) imposed the first of such regulations in the form of design
restrictions on new gas cans manufactured or sold within the state
starting in 2001.17 These regulations required that new cans be made of
non-permeable materials, include redesigned spouts with automatic
closing features, and no longer feature separate venting holes. 18

Figure 2: CARB/EPA compliant gas can. Note auto-closing spout and lack of
separate rear vent.19

15. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 168.11(2)(2015) (requiring all gasoline containers to be “substantially
a bright red color”).
16. See M. Nguyen, California Air Resources Board, Source Inventory Category #1434:
Portable
Fuel
Container
Spillage,
Base
Year
1999
(1999),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/ei/areasrc/districtmeth/BayArea/C1434.pdf (study identifying portable fuel
containers as significant source of evaporative emissions).
17. See 1999 CARB PFC Rule, supra note 3.
18. See California Air Resources Board, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and
Spouts (August 16, 2010), https://www.arb.ca.gov/consprod/fuel-containers/pfc/facts/sep99_facts.htm.
19. Image source: author.
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The rules aimed to reduce VOC emissions from both fundamental
design characteristics of cans (permeability) and from user carelessness
(leaving caps or spouts open).20 Estimated emissions reductions from the
rule were “over 68 tons per day” of reactive organic gases (ROGs), a
somewhat narrower category of pollutants than VOCs. 21 These
regulations were updated and revised in 2006. 22
It is not surprising that California was the first state to impose
emissions-driven regulations on gas cans. Historically it has been a
leader among states in setting new environmental rules, and it has
struggled for decades to meet the NAAQS in areas throughout the state,
most notably the Central Valley and Los Angeles Basin. 23 Other states
followed California’s lead, however, largely in an effort to meet the
ozone NAAQS, which have persistently proved difficult in a number of
major cities. 24 New York, for example, imposed gas can regulations
similar to California’s in 2003, which it estimated would lead to 50 tons
per day in VOC emissions reductions, along with other benefits from
reduction in ground and surface water contamination. 25 In 2007, the
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted gas can
regulations under Section 183(e) of the Clean Air Act. 26 Although
differing from California’s 1999 approach in important ways discussed
below, these rules effectively imposed the same requirements
nationally.27 The sale and manufacture of old-style gas cans was banned,
in favor of new models featuring low-permeability materials and
automatically-closing spouts, and lacking vents. 28

20. See California Air Resources Board, Updated Informative Digest, Adoption of Portable Fuel
Container Spillage Control Regulations at 1 (1999), https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/spillcon/gasinf.pdf.
21. Id. at 5.
22. California Air Resources Board, Final Regulation Order: Portable Fuel Container
Regulation
(2006),
(amending
13
Cal
Code
of
Reg
§2467
et
seq),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/pfc/2005/frorev2.pdf.
23. See California Air Resources Board, Federal Standard Area Designations,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/desig/feddesig.htm (noting designation of a number of California counties as
nonattainment areas for ozone, PM2.5, and other NAAQS pollutants).
24. See
EPA,
8-Hour
Ozone
(2008)
Nonattainment
Areas,
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/hnc.html (noting designation of Los Angeles and the San
Joaquin Valley as “extreme” nonattainment areas for ozone, other California areas as “severe”, and
cities including Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, New York, and Phoenix as “moderate”).
25. See New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Portable Fuel Container
Fact Sheet, https://web.archive.org/web/20170324054635/http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8579.html.
26. EPA PFC Rule, supra at 8499.
27. See id. at 8432 (“[t]he revised California program is very similar to the program we are
finalizing”).
28. See id. at 8500 (describing requirements of the EPA standards). As discussed below, the EPA
regulations are performance standards, so they do not require specific vent or spout designs. In practice,
however, auto-closing spouts are required and vents are forbidden, the latter because testing procedures
assume they will be left open.
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CARB and EPA analysis indicated that these regulations were costbenefit justified, with benefits of emissions reduction exceeding costs of
new cans imposed on manufacturers and consumers. 29 The regulations
also achieved VOC emissions reductions at a lower cost-per-ton than
alternative measures.30
B. Consumer Reactions
At first blush, these regulations would seem good for everyone: users
of gas cans benefit from reduced spills and evaporative losses, while the
public at large benefits from improved air quality. In reality, however,
the regulations have generated significant consumer dissatisfaction.
New-style cans are more expensive—in its 1999 revised regulations
California estimated an increased cost of $6-11 per can. 31 The new style
gas cans are also more difficult to operate, often requiring two hands, 32
and may have lower pour rates, taking longer to fill tanks from a can. 33
The additional complexity involved in operating spouts on the new cans
is a source of consumer frustration and, anecdotal evidence suggests,
more (rather than less) spilling of gasoline for some users. To give a few
examples of consumer views on these new cans:
If you’ve had the pleasure of buying a gas can in the past few
years, then you’ve likely come to the conclusion that all modern
gas cans suck. . . the actual implementation of these regulations has
29. See id. at 8430-8431 (estimating benefits substantially exceeding costs). See also California
Air Resources Board, Updated Informative Digest: Amendments to the Regulations for Portable Fuel
Containers at 2 (2006), https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/pfc/2005/pfcuid.pdf (noting that “[t]he ARB staff
determined that adopting the proposal is technologically feasible, cost-effective, and provides the
greatest benefits to the people of California”).
30. See id. at 8511(estimating costs per ton of hydrocarbon and benzene emissions reductions
from PFC regulations at $0/ton, once fuel savings are considered, compared to vehicle emissions
regulations imposed in the same rulemaking at $14/ton for hydrocarbons and $270/ton for benzene). See
also CARB, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and Spouts, supra note 18 (noting that the
1999 California regulations were estimated to impose costs of about $2/ton of reduced ROG emissions,
compared to $5/ton for contemporaneous alternative regulations).
31. See CARB, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and Spouts, supra note 18.
32. See, e.g.,. Acme Tools, No Spill Gas Can, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KneiOE7pqj4 (video showing proper use of one model of CARBcompliant gas can, requiring one hand to hold the can while another operates the spout). But see, Scepter
Products, How to use your ECO Can – English, YOUTUBE (Jul. 10, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nytxlA-G1Sk (video showing operation of another CARBcompliant design that relies on plastic protrusions from the spout that allow stable receptacles like
vehicles or lawnmowers to stabilize the can, allowing one-handed operation).
33. See Greg DiBernardo, Gas Cans that Actually Work, TOOLS OF THE TRADE (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.toolsofthetrade.net/trucks-equipment/gas-cans-that-actually-work_o (testing pour rates of
gas cans, and finding that CARB-compliant cans take 2:23-2:37 to pour 5 gallons of fuel, while an
unregulated “utility jug” similar in design to pre-regulation cans takes 1:50 to pour the same amount).
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been a disaster. These new cans have caused more gas to spill and
more fumes to escape than any gas can in history. At least in my
history; I don’t have any statistics to report about spills outside of
my own garage. Suffice to say that everyone I’ve talked to about
these new cans hates them, and reports similarly alarming spill
statistics from their own experiences in their own garages. 34
This one doesn’t have a vent. Who would make a can without a
vent unless it was done under duress? After all, everyone knows to
vent anything that pours. Otherwise, it doesn’t pour right and is
likely to spill.35
The only gas cans they sell nowadays is [sic] a plastic one with a
complicated thin plastic twisty spring loaded mechanism on the
spout. The directions suck and so does the spout. One little twist
and the thin plastic breaks, causing the seal to break. Tip the spout
towards the lawn mower and half of it spills on the ground and
over your hands. 36
In short, many gas can users do not like the new gas cans. Can
manufacturers claim that more recent post-regulation designs have
mitigated problems,37 but difficulty of use and consumer dissatisfaction
appears persistent. 38
The gas can regulations may be justified based on their public
benefits (i.e. reduction in the emissions externality), but consumer
dissatisfaction suggests the regulation is a net negative considering only
its private costs and benefits (i.e. to consumers). More expensive cans
that do not work as well as those they replace are unlikely to be a
popular option. Put differently, had they not been required by regulation
it seems unlikely that new-style cans would have been successful in the
34. GAD’s Ramblings, One Man’s Quest for Gas Cans that Don’t Suck (Nov. 22, 2012),
http://www.gad.net/Blog/2012/11/22/one-mans-quest-for-gas-cans-that-dont-suck/.
35. Jeffrey Tucker, LAISSEZ FAIRE, How Government Wrecked the Gas Can (May 7, 2012),
https://lfb.org/how-government-wrecked-the-gas-can.
36. Intheknow, D AILY KOS, Has anyone purchases a new gas can lately? (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/11/6/1342736/-Has-anyone-purchased-a-new-gas-can-lately.
37. See,
e.g.,.
No-Spill
Inc.,
Features…Functions…&
Benefits…,
(2017)
http://www.nospill.com/Why-NO-SPILL-.html (citing ease-of-use advantages of one particular CARBcompliant model along with testimonials from customers and dealers).
38. See GAD’s Ramblings, supra note 34 (describing the No-Spill can as the best of the CARBcompliant cans tested, but nevertheless concluding it has “many of the drawbacks that all of the new
cans share, like hard to open, locking tops (especially in the cold), obnoxious caps that prevent the
nozzle from fitting in gas tanks, what seem to be a terribly confusing spout assemblies, and finally, a
ridiculously high price tag for all that pain”). See also DiBernardo, supra note 33 (finding that a Nospill can had the slowest pour rate among cans tested).
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market. Some of this resistance, of course, could be due to a learning
curve associated with the new cans or simple resistance to change, but
that does not make it any less real.
Regulators are aware of consumer resistance to post-regulation gas
can designs—the 2005 revised California regulations “changed some
existing requirements for flow-rate and spout design to make them more
consumer friendly” in hopes that they would “result in containers that
are easier and better accepted by the public.”39 California also revised its
regulations so as to no longer require spouts with automatic shut-off
features in response to consumer dissatisfaction. 40
It is even possible that the PFC regulations are counterproductive. If
anecdotal evidence that the new cans lead to more spillage rather than
less is correct, then it is possible that the regulations are not even
justified based on their public environmental benefits. Spilled gasoline
will inevitably evaporate, leading to VOC emissions. Good data on
gasoline spill rates from pre- and post-regulation cans does not appear to
be available, however. But even assuming that spills are not more likely
in the long run, it is enough to consider the implications of customer
dissatisfaction with post-regulation cans.
This dissatisfaction should come as no surprise. It is probably
unreasonable to expect that consumers would be happy with the tradeoff
between the difficulty of use of the new cans and their relatively small
private benefits (less fuel loss through evaporation). 41 More generally,
anyone subject to a regulation that imposes private costs in favor of
public benefits is unlikely to be pleased with it. Certainly industry
opposition to environmental and other regulation is de rigueur. At least
among environmental regulations, however, the CARB/EPA gas can
rules are unusual in that they directly affect consumers. More precisely,
they affect consumer choice and specific features of consumer products,
rather than simply imposing higher costs as an indirect effect of
regulation on industry. Direct regulation of consumer products is
common in other regulatory spheres (most notably product and
food/drug safety), but it is not usually the locus of environmental
regulation. Vehicles (discussed below) are perhaps the largest exception.

39. California Environmental Protection Agency, News Release, ARB Upgrades Clean Gas
Rules (Sep. 15, 2005), https://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr091505.htm.
40. See EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2 at 8500.
41. See id. at 8521 (stating that “gasoline fuel savings are not included in the market analysis for
this economic impact analysis because these savings are not expected to affect consumer decisions with
respect to the purchase of new containers”).
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C. Consumer Evasion
Those subject to a regulation may oppose it in administrative, legal,
or legislative venues, and even seek to skirt or evade it. Typically,
regulated industries play this role, but the direct effects of gas can
regulations on consumer choice give consumers an incentive to oppose
or evade them as well. Consumers have strongly and creatively
responded to this incentive, adopting a variety of tactics to evade gas
can regulations—in the process reducing or negating any environmental
benefits.
First, the gas can regulations apply only to the manufacture or sale of
new cans. 42 Old-style vented cans are still legal to own and use. 43 But
their supply is now limited, with the predictable result that their price
has increased.44 Therefore, users may hoard old cans, keep them in
service longer (perhaps even if they leak), and, as noted, pay higher
prices in the second-hand market for them. These behaviors may lead
old cans to be retained in use at a greater rate than predicted by
regulators, reducing expected benefits of the regulation (not to mention
reducing revenues for manufacturers of new cans). 45 In principle, a
black-market for old-style cans could develop. I know of no evidence
for this, though there is anecdotal evidence of vented cans being
purchased in Canada for use in the US, circumventing EPA’s national
regulation. 46
A second option is for consumers to modify new cans, defeating the
42. See id. at 8432 (stating that EPA national PFC regulations apply only to containers
manufactured on or after January 1, 2009).
43. Id. (cans manufactured before January 1, 2009 not regulated).
44. Used old-style (vented) 5 gallon cans were available at time of writing for around $35-50
shipped, compared to as little as $20 for a new condition compliant can. Compare eBay listings of 5gallon used pre-regulation cans (“5 gallon preban gas can”), http:// goo.gl/5KpVPh with those for new
post-regulation cans (“5 gallon gas can CARB”), https://goo.gl/gUDgow. As noted above, the
regulations also increased the price of new cans relative to pre-regulation cans, by an estimated $6-11.
See CARB, Regulations for Portable Fuel Containers (PFC) and Spouts supra note 18. EPA predicted
at 57% increase in gas can costs, and further predicted that 99% of these costs would be passed on to
consumers. See EPA PFC Rule at 8521, 8523.
45. In 1999, California regulators estimated the average useful life of gas cans at 5 years.
Although it is possible that the analysis producing this average contemplated a long tail of gas cans with
much longer useful life, the widespread availability of pre-regulation cans 16 years after the initial
CARB regulations and 7 years after the national EPA regulations suggests either that this estimate was
too low or that the regulations encouraged consumers to keep pre-regulation cans longer than they
would have otherwise. See California Air Resources Board, Hearing Notice and Staff Report: Initial
Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rule Making, Public Hearing to Consider the Adoption of Portable
Fuel
Container
Spillage
Control
Regulations
(Aug.
6,
1999)
at
23,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/spillcon/isor.pdf.
46. See, e.g.,. Post on “The Hull Truth Boating Forum” (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.thehulltruth.com/dockside-chat/472908-where-get-real-5-gallon-gas-cans.html (describing
successful purchase of unregulated cans in Canada and importation into the US).
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emissions-control features. Instructions for how to do so are easily
found; one simple fix is to drill a hole in a can and mount a tire valve
(with the core removed) in the hole, creating a sealable vent, as shown
in Figure 3. 47 An even simpler modification, if it can be called that, is to
remove the troublesome spout and pour directly from the can into a
funnel.

Figure 3: Gas can modified to allow venting

D. Consumer-Producer Cooperation…or Collusion
These methods for evading gas can regulations are purely consumerdriven. Depending on one’s perspective, they could be viewed as either
scofflaw mischief or homespun ingenuity (or perhaps some of both).
Such reactions are not surprising, though they do illustrate—in dollar
terms, in the case of higher prices for old cans—the level of consumer
dissatisfaction with the regulatory mandate. More interesting from a
regulatory design perspective, however, are another class of reactions
that are neither purely consumer nor purely producer, instead requiring
tacit cooperation or outright collusion between the two to evade
regulation.
47. See, e.g., DoubleSurvivalists, How to Fix a New Gas Can, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lcnwdIYEfI (detailing process for modifying post-regulation cans
to add a vent).
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Perhaps the simplest way to evade the gas can regulations is to store
gasoline in another container, one lacking the troublesome new spout
and having a vent. Ready substitutes exist, most obviously cans intended
for other fuels such as diesel and kerosene. One might expect such
containers to be regulated at the same standards as gas cans, since all
volatile petroleum fuels contribute to VOC emissions if they spill or
evaporate; however, early versions of the gas can regulations excluded
containers for other fuels. 48 As a result, consumers, frustrated with new
gas cans, had a ready substitute that was often sold on the same shelf. 49
In 2005, California closed this loophole by including kerosene cans in
its revised standards, explicitly to prevent consumer evasion of the
regulation. 50 The rule does not address whether imposing restrictions on
kerosene containers is justified on its own merits, i.e., considering
emissions from kerosene containers used for kerosene only. The EPA
followed suit in its 2007 national regulations by including diesel and
kerosene containers. 51
Including containers labeled for other fuels within the regulations
does not, of course, prevent consumers from using other containers not
explicitly marketed for use with fuel. One example are so-called “utility
jugs” not labeled as gas cans but often with auto racing-themed branding
(see Figure 4). These are fairly clearly aimed at the gas can market; as
EPA notes, they are “designed and marketed for use with gasoline.” 52
Recognizing this loophole in the early California rules, EPA’s 2005
regulations apply to utility jugs 53 and California has clarified that its
rules also apply. 54 Nevertheless, manufacturers seem to evade these
requirements—utility jugs with vents and without auto-closing spouts
are still available from national retailers, as shown in Figure 4.55

48. See California Air Resources Board, Staff Report: Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed
Amendments
to
the
Portable
Fuel
Container
Regulations
(July
29,
2005),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/pfc/2005/isor.pdf (noting that “kerosene containers that were not included
in the original regulations have become inexpensive PFC substitutes”).
49. Id.
50. See California Air Resources Board, New Requirements for Kerosene Containers (Oct 2005),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs338.pdf (describing revisions to the 2005 California PFC
regulations to include previously unregulated kerosene containers).
51. See EPA PFC Rule, supra note 2 at 8499.
52. Id. at 8500.
53. Id.
54. See California Air Resources Board, Clarified Requirements for Utility Jugs (Dec. 2005),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs342.pdf.
55. See, e.g., .VP Racing Fuel 3012 Red Fuel Jug, Amazon.com, https://smile.amazon.com/VPRacing-Fuel-3012-Red/dp/B003TTPHLQ.
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Figure 4: "Utility jug";
note vent, lack of self-closing
spout, and auto racing
branding.

Another option is to use containers not designed for petroleum fuels
at all. In principle, it is of course possible to store gasoline in any large
container, but a container has to be a superior substitute to postregulation gas cans to be an attractive alternative. Containers that leak,
react with gasoline, or are unwieldy to pour will not tempt consumers.
But at least one product will: military-style potable water containers.
Such containers are made by the same manufacturers as military-style
gasoline cans, and are designed to the same size specifications
(presumably initially for military standardization and storage
purposes).56 Crucially, they have old-style spouts and vents.

Figure 5: Potable water can (note old-style spout and presence of vent) and
similar regulation-compliant gas can from the same manufacturer

56. Compare
Scepter
ECO
Jerry
Can,
Amazon.com,
available
at
https://smile.amazon.com/Scepter-Resistant-Closures-5-Gallon-Military/dp/B000MT94TC (CARB/EPA
compliant
gas
can)
with
Scepter
Water
Can,
Amazon.com,
available
at
https://smile.amazon.com/Scepter-04933-Water-Can-5-Gallon/dp/B000MTI0GA (Water can from the
same manufacturer, in a nearly identical design, with pre-regulation spout and vent).
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Although not marketed for use with fuel (and in fact clearly labeled
for water use), consumers are buying these cans for use with gasoline.
As Amazon reviewers have said about these cans:
Just like the good old days. It makes a great fuel can because it's
got a vent and it pours without any CARB drama. 57
Are you sick of gas cans with locks/valves on them? Do you want
a gas can just like the old-school ones, with a bleeder and simple,
unobstructed pour spout? This is the gas can for you, then, even
though it's sold as a water can and even has markings on the can
stating "Potable Water". As far as I can tell, the only difference is
the color (blue instead of red) and writing on the side. Otherwise,
it's near perfect. It pours very quickly. 58
Great gas can! Screw CARB.59
Using cans not labeled for gasoline use may be a violation of other
safety-driven regulations. But these are effectively unenforceable for
small-scale home use. Simply painting non-gasoline cans red and
marking them “Gasoline” may be sufficient to comply. 60
Using a new container not labeled for gasoline to evade CARB/EPA
emissions regulations requires some level of cooperation between
consumers and manufacturers. The degree of such cooperation varies—
utility jugs are clearly marketed for use with gasoline, but there is little
evidence that water jugs are. Manufacturers would likely insist that
water containers should not be used for gasoline. One manufacturer lists
its water container only among “Canada/International” fuel containers
and indicates it is “not available in the U.S.,” presumably to avoid the
implication that it could or should be used for gasoline. 61 Despite the
claim, however, the container is in fact available in the U.S. 62
Manufacturers do of course profit from cans not marked for gasoline
57. Ron Strand, Customer Review, Amazon.com (May 23, 2012), available at
https://smile.amazon.com/review/R28CTMWIA2B76U.
58. Culturejamming, Customer Review, Amazon.com (September 6, 2016), available at
https://smile.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/ROUS9S4S6HNQN.
59. Corey Reynolds, Customer Review, Amazon.com (July 20, 2015), available at
https://smile.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R1HFK2Y4RUD90Q.
60. See, e.g., Wis.. WI Stat. § 168.11 (2015) (containers used to store gasoline must be “a bright
red color” and be marked with their contents, but the statute does not specify whether this color and
marking must be applied by the manufacturer, or whether the container must be designed and marketed
for gasoline use).
61. See
Scepter,
Inc.,
CDN/INT’L
Fuel
Containers,
available
at
http://www.scepterconsumer.com/fuel_containers/regular_fuel_containers/.
62. Scepter Water Can, Amazon.com, available at https://smile.amazon.com/Scepter-04933Water-Can-5-Gallon/dp/B000MTI0GA.
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sold to consumers seeking to evade regulations. Some of these sales may
cannibalize sales of compliant cans (possibly reducing profits given the
higher cost of compliant cans). But the availability of unregulated retail
options may also attract customers away from the secondary market for
pre-regulation cans, increasing overall retail sales and manufacturer
profits.
A final option for evading gas can emissions regulations is the
clearest example of consumer-manufacturer collusion: some firms
provide aftermarket kits for modifying cans so as to circumvent the
emissions-reduction features. For example, the “EZ-Pour Universal
Replacement Spout and Vent Kit” allows you to “make your gas can
great again.”63 The manufacturer’s website states that the kit “is
designed and sold as replacement parts specifically for portable fuel
containers manufactured before January 2009,”64 and the product is
marketed as a “water jug spout” in some states. 65 Presumably these
statements and labeling are intended to escape regulatory scrutiny.
However, a photo on the product’s web page touts the kit’s
compatibility with a wide range of post-regulation cans,66 and the
product’s instructions describe how to drill a hole in an unvented can, an
unnecessary step if the kit were used only to repair a pre-regulation
vented can.67
A similar product, the “No-Bama Replacement Spout & Vent Kit”
more openly targets consumers seeking to avoid regulation. 68 This
product also claims to be aimed at repair of old cans, but the seller’s
video installation instructions show modification of a post-regulation
can and describe the advantages of the product’s non-compliant
traditional spout over self-closing spouts.69 The product’s name is a
(perhaps knowing) misnomer: the 2005 EPA regulations were finalized
under the George W. Bush administration.

63. EZ-POUR Universal Fuel and Water Jug Spout, available at http://ezpourspout.com/.
64. Id.
65. See EZ-POUR, Order Water Spouts, http://ezpourspout.com/order/order-water-can-2/ (note
alternative labeling of same product as “water jug spout”; website users are directed to this page after
indicating they are residents of one of 9 states, including California and New York, or the District of
Columbia, which have state-level gas can regulations).
66. EZ-POUR, Compatible Fuel Cans, http://ezpourspout.com/compatible-cans/compatiblecans/.
67. EZ-POUR,
Installation
Instructions,
http://ezpourspout.com/INSTRUCTIONSENGLISH.pdf.
68. No-Bama
Replacement
Spout
&
Vent
Kit,
alaskansongs.com,
http://alaskansongs.com/product/no-bama-replacement-spout-vent-kit/.
69. 360 Productions, No-Bama Replacement Spout and Vent Kit, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hh9RlMC3G-E.
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Figure 6: The “No-Bama Replacement Spout and Vent Kit”

To be clear, neither of these products appear to be made by firms that
manufacture regulated cans. At least one can manufacturer does,
however, supply “replacement spouts” that can be used to circumvent
the regulatory requirement for self-closing spouts, but unlike the kits
described above, this product does not include a vent. 70
In short, consumers have multiple, relatively easy ways to purchase
products from gas can manufacturers or third parties to effectively evade
the EPA’s and CARB’s gas can regulations. The degree of such
consumer-producer cooperation varies: major gas can manufacturers
produce only compliant cans for the US market, and do not openly
market substitutes (such as water cans) for gasoline use. But they do sell
and profit from these products, and some offer replacement parts that
can be used to circumvent the regulations. Smaller firms produce
products that are more openly marketed toward regulatory evasion, from
“utility cans” with racing-themed branding to the “No-Bama” retrofit
spout and vent.

70. Moeller Scepter Gas/Diesel/Water Can Replacement Parts, Amazon.com, available at
https://www.amazon.com/Moeller-Scepter-Diesel-Water-Replacement/dp/B000MTCQO2.
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E. Environmental and Political Effects
It is difficult and likely impossible to determine the degree to which
consumers have been able to evade the EPA/CARB gas can regulations.
Home modifications are impossible to track, and though it may be
possible to obtain sales data for water cans and modification kits, it
would remain unclear to what extent these were used for their ostensibly
intended uses or for regulatory evasion. It is at least clear, however, that
sufficient evasion occurs to support a market in products implicitly or
explicitly aimed at enabling evasion.
If evasion is significant, it erodes the environmental benefits of the
regulation. Some forms of evasion also increase private costs: some
consumers may buy compliant cans, install aftermarket replacements or
home modifications, and discard the complex spouts that drive up prices
of the new cans. Such customers must pay twice—first for the postregulation can, then again for aftermarket kits or parts for homebrew
modification. They then discard the new spout, likely the most
expensive part of the can, and must spend time making the
modifications. Administrative costs for regulators also increase, as
evidenced by California’s revisions in 2005, including utility jugs and
kerosene cans so as to shut off the most obvious evasion opportunities. 71
But perhaps less obvious are the political costs of the gas can
regulations. As the consumer complaints about compliant cans and
comments regarding products for evading the regulations indicate,
consumer dissatisfaction is significant. Moreover, dissatisfaction is not
limited to consumers whose politics might attract them to products like
the “No-Bama” replacement spout. As a user of left-leaning website
Daily Kos puts it:
I love President Obama and what he has done for this country.
However the gas can regulations translate to everyday people who
mow yards and snow blow driveways as pure stupidity. The gas
cans can be what people think about when they hear these doom
and gloom Obamacare stories coming from Republicans. They see
the new gas cans and believe the GOP when they charge
incompetence. 72
I suspect most readers were unfamiliar with gas can regulations, and
certainly with consumer dissatisfaction and attempts at evasion. These
are relatively minor environmental regulations in terms of both cost and
71. See California Air Resources Board, New Requirements for Kerosene Containers, supra note
50.
72. Intheknow, Daily Kos, Has anyone purchases a new gas can lately?, supra note 36.
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environmental benefit.; Their visibility to and impact on frequent gas
can users is non-trivial, however, or at least appears to play into
preexisting anti-regulatory sentiment to a greater degree than other
environmental regulations with less direct effect on consumers. The
failures of new-style cans are not only a source of frustration but, for
some, a vivid example of what they perceive as general regulatory
overreach.
III. REGULATING LIGHT BULB EFFICIENCY
Some readers may be reminded of a similar regulatory story that
received much greater public attention—the federal government’s
alleged ban on incandescent light bulbs. This experience shares many
characteristics with that of the gas can regulation, although there are
important differences. Environmental regulation directly affecting
consumers is imposed (though by Congress, not regulators). It is well
intentioned, appearing to generate both public and private net benefits.
But many consumers are unhappy with the resulting reduction in
choices, either because they find the new options to be poor substitutes
or because of principled objections to regulatory interference (or
both)—though there is never a complete ban on the old bulbs. Some
consumers react by finding ways to evade the regulation, assisted in
these efforts by industry but not by the largest firms.
Incandescent light bulbs produce light by running electric current
through a metal (usually tungsten) filament, producing light as well as
heat.73 They have long been the most prevalent electric lighting
technology, but are relatively inefficient (in terms of light output per
unit of energy input) relative to alternatives. Less than 10% of energy
input to an incandescent bulb is converted into visible light. 74 Both
fluorescent lighting and electronic LED (light emitting diode) bulbs are
substantially more efficient. 75 LED and compact fluorescent (CFL)
bulbs only became commercially available relatively recently, however.
Of the two new technologies, CFLs became available first, in the 1990s,
and more widely in the early 2000s. 76 LED availability has substantially
increased and prices have substantially dropped since 2008. 77 Despite
73. See
Incandescent
Light
Bulb,
Wikipedia
available
at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incandescent_light_bulb.
74. See Department of Energy, Lighting Choices to Save You Money, Energy.gov, available at
https://energy.gov/energysaver/lighting-choices-save-you-money (indicating that 90% of energy input
for incandescent bulbs is given off as heat).
75. Id.
76. See Department of Energy, The History of the Light Bulb, Energy.gov, available at
https://www.energy.gov/articles/history-light-bulb
77. Id.
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their superior efficiency, however, consumers were slow to adopt the
new CFLs.78 This is a specific illustration of the wider “energy
efficiency paradox” or “gap,” an expression of academic puzzlement at
consumers’ reluctance or inability to take advantage of energy
efficiency opportunities that at least appear to be beneficial even
considering only their private costs. 79

Figure 7: Light bulb technologies; from left to right, an LED, incandescent, and
CFL bulb. All three produce roughly the same amount of light, but the
incandescent bulb uses 60 watts of electricity to do so, while the CFL uses 13 watts
and the LED only 7.5 watts. 80

78. Id.
79. See, e.g. Kenneth Gillingham and Karen Palmer, Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy
Insights from Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 8 REV. ENVIRON. ECON. POLICY 18 (2014)
(analyzing empirical evidence for various explanations of an energy efficiency gap).
80. Image source: Flickr user trenttsd, CC BY 2.0 license, available at
https://www.flickr.com/photos/84335369@N00/3258261439.
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A. The Light Bulb “Ban”
Of course, energy efficiency improvements also have public benefits.
Lower energy use means less air pollution from fossil fuel power plants,
and less need for investment in new generation paid for by all
ratepayers. The government, therefore, promotes energy efficiency
through regulatory tools, from building codes to tax deductions. The
most frequently used tool is probably product efficiency standards,
applied to consumer products that range from vehicles to appliances. 81
In 2007, Congress passed legislation—the Energy Independence and
Security Act (EISA)—that imposed efficiency standards on most light
bulbs.82 These standards would effectively ban the manufacture of most
incandescent light bulbs, at least without large efficiency improvements.
The statute also directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to
promulgate more stringent standards after 2014. 83 Bulbs also must
continue to improve, achieving a 60-70% efficiency improvement over
2008 levels (45 lumens per watt) by 2020.84
The 2007 efficiency standards inspired political and consumer
pushback even before entering into effect. Conservative groups attacked
the regulation as “governmental interference in our lives” or
“interfer[ence] with free enterprise.” 85 In 2011, then-Secretary of Energy
Steven Chu responded with the assertion that “We are taking away a
choice that continues to let people waste their own money.”86
Republican legislators, some of whom voted for the 2007 bill, 87 passed
legislation defunding enforcement of the regulation. 88 Lighting industry
81. See, e.g., Department of Energy, Appliance and Equipment Standards Program,
ENERGY. GOV, https://energy.gov/eere/buildings/appliance-and-equipment-standards-program (detailing
federal efficiency standards for “more than 60 categories of appliances and equipment”).
82. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 321, 121 Stat. 1492,
1573-87 (2007).
83. Energy Independence and Security Act § 321(a)(6)(A)(i).
84. Id. at § 321(a)(6)(A)(v).
85. See Robert Farley, Banned light bulbs? Is the government saying no to incandescents?
POLITIFACT (May 24, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2011/may/24/governmentbanning-incandescent-light-bulbs/ (quoting from a fundraising letter sent by AmeriPAC, “a political
action committee that largely supports conservative Republican candidates” and the Center for the
Defense of Free Enterprise Action Fund).
86. See Ryan Tracy and Stephanie Gleason, New Flare-Up in Light-Bulb Wars, WALL ST. J.
(July 9, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304793504576434122693094168
(quoting Secretary Chu in a conference call with reporters).
87. See Sean Collins Walsh, G.O.P. Bid to Void Light Bulb Fails, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/business/energy-environment/republicans-fail-to-annul-new-lightbulb-law.html (quoting Fred Upton [R-MI] in 2007 characterizing the EISA as a “common-sense,
bipartisan approach”, only later to remove the statement from his website and replace it with a claim that
“[t]he public response on this issue is a clear signal that markets—not governments—should be driving
technological advancements”).
88. See Stephen Dinan, Congress overturns incandescent light bulb ban, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 16,
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firms spoke in favor of the impending regulation, however, claiming
they had already made anticipatory investments; it is also possible they
expected greater revenues and profits from the new, more expensive
bulbs relative to commodity-priced incandescent bulbs.89 Despite this
period of public controversy and political retrenchment, the EISA
remains in effect, along with its efficiency standards for incandescent
bulbs.90
B. Consumer Reactions
Initially, many consumers felt that new bulbs were inferior. CFLs
were moderately more expensive up front, often did not work with
dimmer switches, produced a flicker that some found annoying, and
released mercury vapor if broken, among other complaints. 91 LEDs were
even more expensive up front, though their long life and low energy use
made them cheaper over the long run. 92 Many consumers simply
preferred incandescent bulbs, even once they became aware of
alternatives and their energy-saving advantages.93 The “light bulb ban”
remains an oft-cited symbol of alleged over-regulation and government
intrusion into consumer decision making. 94
Despite this controversy, the EISA bulb regulations entered into
effect more or less as planned during the 2012-2014 period. 95 Today,
few if any traditional general service, non-halogen incandescent bulbs
are produced in the US,96 and are not widely available. 97 Unsurprisingly,
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/16/congress-overturns-incandescent-light-bulbban/.
89. See Tracy and Gleason, supra note 86.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(2018) (codifying the 2007 EISA).
91. See, e.g.,.
Nick Davis,
Disadvantages of
CFL
Light Bulbs, EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/list_6508643_disadvantages-cfl-light-bulbs.html.
92. See Department of Energy, How Energy-Efficiency Light Bulbs Compare with Traditional
Incandescents, ENERGY. GOV, https://energy.gov/energysaver/how-energy-efficient-light-bulbs-comparetraditional-incandescents.
93. See, e.g.,. Jolie Dee, Why people still use inefficient incandescent light bulbs, USA TODAY
(Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2013/12/27/incandescent-light-bulbsphaseout-leds/4217009/; Penelope Green, Light Bulb Saving Time, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/garden/fearing-the-phase-out-of-incandescent-bulbs.html
(describing preference of some interior designers and restauranteurs for incandescent light).
94. See, e.g. The Colbert Report, Light Bulb Ban, COMEDY CENTRAL (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.cc.com/video-clips/29cv4a/the-colbert-report-light-bulb-ban (satirizing the 2007 EISA); See
also Tim Worstall, Brexit Will Free The Bendy Banana, Incandescent Light Bulbs And Tomato
Marmalade, FORBES (June 26, 2016) (claiming that the UK’s vote to leave the European Union will free
it from burdensome EU regulations, including an incandescent phase-out).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(2018) (codifying the 2007 EISA); see also Department of Energy,
New Lighting Standards Began in 2012, ENERGY. GOV, https://energy.gov/energysaver/new-lightingstandards-began-2012.
96. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, Light bulb factory closes; End of era for U.S. means more jobs
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some consumers reacted by attempting to evade the ban. “Evade” is
perhaps not the right term—few of the strategies for continuing to use
incandescent bulbs described below violate the law. All do, however,
circumvent its goal of pushing consumers toward alternatives.
Consumers’ first and best option was to buy traditional incandescent
bulbs while they remained available. The EISA did not ban sale of
incandescent bulbs, only their manufacture. 98 Retailer stock persisted for
some time, 99 and some consumers hoarded incandescent bulbs in
advance of the ban on manufacture.100 Industry provided a second
option—manufacturers were able to produce improved halogen
incandescent bulbs that could meet the 2012-2014 standards. 101 These
halogen bulbs have characteristics similar to traditional incandescent
bulbs, but they are more expensive. 102 This is only a temporary option,
however, because halogen bulbs will not meet the stricter 2020
efficiency standards. 103 Another option is to import bulbs from countries
outside the U.S. without equivalent bans. The EISA does forbid
importation of bulbs that violate its efficiency standards,104 but imported
overseas,
WASH.
POST
(Sep.
8,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/07/AR2010090706933.html.
97. For example, as of this writing major retailers like Home Depot no longer offer general
service incandescent bulbs for sale, offering only halogen “eco-incandescent” bulbs and specialized
types like flood or globe lights excluded from the EISA regulations. See Home Depot, Incandescent
Light
Bulbs,
available at
http://www.homedepot.com/b/Lighting-Ceiling-Fans-Light-BulbsIncandescent-Light-Bulbs/N-5yc1vZbmgl.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(2) (“it shall not be unlawful for a manufacturer to sell a lamp which is in
compliance with the law at the time such lamp was manufactured”).
99. See Patrick K. Kiger, U.S. Phase-Out of Incandescent Light Bulbs Continues in 2014 with
40-,
60-Watt
Varieties,
NAT.
GEO.
(Dec.
31,
2013),
http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2013/12/31/u-s-phase-out-of-incandescent-light-bulbscontinues-in-2014-with-40-60-watt-varieties/ (“[u]ntil the supplies run out, the old bulbs still will be
available on store shelves, alongside the electricity-saving alternatives that gradually will replace
them”).
100. See, e.g.,. Nancy Smith, How to Have Incandescent Light Bulbs for the Rest of Your Life,
PREP HAPPY (Jan. 10, 2014), http://prephappy.com/light/how-to-have-incandescent-light-bulbs-for-therest-of-your-life/ (detailed instructions on how to hoard pre-regulation incandescent bulbs, including
instructions on long-term storage and a calculator for determining how many bulbs to buy for long-term
needs); see also Cord Jefferson, The American Outlaws Hoarding Lightbulbs in the Name of Liberty,
GIZMODO (Sep. 20, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5943048/the-american-outlaws-hoarding-lightbulbs-inthe-name-of-liberty.
101. See
Department
of
Energy,
Incandescent
Lighting,
ENERGY. GOV,
https://energy.gov/energysaver/incandescent-lighting (describing halogen bulb technology as a
replacement for traditional incandescent bulbs that will be phased out due to regulation).
102. Id.
103. See Owen Comstock and Kevin Jarzomski, LED bulb efficiency expected to continue
improving as cost declines, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar.
19, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=15471 (“[a]n additional round of standards
taking effect in 2020 will likely be too stringent for halogen incandescent lamps to meet, and major
manufacturers have already focused development on more-efficient technologies”).
104. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 321(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV),
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bulbs nevertheless appear to be available. 105 Sellers of imported bulbs
may be evading detection by regulators, or regulators may be unable to
enforce the standards against smugglers due to lack of congressional
appropriations to do so.106
C. Consumer-Producer Cooperation
No such bulb-smuggling is necessary, however, to buy as many
relatively inefficient incandescent bulbs as a consumer wants. This is
due to the wide range of bulb types excluded from the EISA efficiency
rules. Many categories of “specialty” bulbs are excluded, including
candelabra and globe style bulbs, 3-way bulbs, outdoor “bug lights,”
reflector/flood lights, plant grow lights, and “rough-service” bulbs.107 In
other words, only standard lamp bulbs are affected by the standards, at
least initially.108 Since many of the excluded categories can be easily
substituted for lamp bulbs, circumventing the regulation is easy. 109 This
is most true of “rough service” bulbs, defined in the EISA as those with
extra support for filaments and “designated and marketed specifically
for ‘rough service’ applications.”110 In short, manufacturers only need to
make minor changes to bulb designs and change their labeling or
marketing materials in order to continue to sell very similar
incandescent bulbs.
Manufacturers have responded by making rough service bulbs,
previously a niche product, widely available—in fact, they and other
exempted bulbs are the only incandescent bulbs available from most
major retailers.111 Nevertheless, major lighting manufacturers have
increasingly moved production to halogen, CFL and, increasingly, LED
121 Stat. 1492, 1578 (2007) (standards apply to lamps [bulbs] “manufactured or imported after
December 31, 2011”).
105. See, e.g.,. Glen Horn, Customer Review, Amazon.com (Jan. 10, 2017), available at
https://smile.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/RMXAUN6FKE7YY (reporting receipt of 100-watt
incandescent bulbs made in Hungary and marked “Not for Sale in the USA” after online purchase).
106. Large manufacturers, in contrast, are unlikely to restart production of incandescent bulbs
even if DOE lacks funding to pursue legal action.
107. Energy Independence and Security Act § 321(a)(1)(D)(ii).
108. In early 2017, DOE finalized regulation terminating some of the EISA exemptions effective
in 2020, discussed below. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for
General Service Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. 7276 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
109. See id. at 7288 (noting ease of substitution between general service incandescents and some
430).types of specialty bulbs).
110. See Energy Independence and Security Act § 321(a)(1)(X).
111. At the time of writing, the only A-series (traditional shape) 100-watt incandescent bulbs sold
by retailer Home Depot are 3-way, rough service, and other specialty bulbs, all of which are currently
exempt from the efficiency standards. See Homedepot.com, Incandescent Light Bulbs (last visited
March 16, 2017), available at http://www.homedepot.com/b/Electrical-Light-Bulbs-Incandescent-LightBulbs/A-Line/N-5yc1vZbmglZ2bcoqwZ1z132pi?NCNI-5.
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bulbs.112

Figure 8: Market Penetration by Light Bulb Technology by Quarter113

Despite declining production from major firms, independent
manufacturers have entered the market in an effort to meet persistent
demand for incandescent bulbs. New Jersey-based “Newcandescent”
produces (or perhaps just markets) a wide range of bulbs
indistinguishable from traditional incandescent bulbs, most of which are
marketed as rough service bulbs. 114
There is one drawback, however: like halogens, rough service and
other specialty bulbs are more expensive (at least up front) than preregulation incandescent bulbs, at around $2-4 per bulb, compared to the

112. See Tracy Cullen, LED A-Line Lamp Shipments Increase in Third Quarter of 2016, NEMA
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nema.org/news/Pages/LED-A-Line-Lamp-Shipments-Increase-in-ThirdQuarter-of-2016.aspx (detailing substantial increase in market share of halogen, CFL, and LED bulbs
since 2011). See also See LAURA JAMES ET AL.., COLORADO LIGHTING MARKET STUDY 3 (2016),
https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xe/PDF/Regulatory/CO-DSM/CO-Regulatory-DSM-LightingMarket-Study.pdf (2016 survey of Colorado bulb availability, finding little or no pre-regulation bulbs on
store shelves). See also Michael Nunez, GE Will Stop Making CFL Lightbulbs Because LEDs Are
Better, GIZMODO (Feb. 1, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/ge-will-no-longer-make-cfl-lighbulbs1756344245.
113. Cullen, supra note 114.
114. See Incandescent Light Bulbs, NEWCANDESCENT, http://www.newcandescent.com/ (“In
order to address the demand by the public for the quality of light that an incandescent light bulb
produces, the Newcandescent light bulb was created. This modified version of the incandescent light
bulb provides the same quality of light most have come to expect…This longer lasting light bulb can
also be used for “rough use” and is exempt from this recent legislation”).
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under a $1 prices once charged for incandescent bulbs.115 It is unclear
whether these higher prices are due to the slight modifications necessary
to qualify bulbs as rough service or to reductions in economies of scale
due to lower demand. At these prices for exempted bulbs, incandescent
bulbs become much less attractive when compared with declining prices
for more efficient bulbs, especially LEDs. For similar light output and at
2016-2017 prices, LEDs are around the same price as rough service
incandescent bulbs, but have a much longer life and reduced energy
requirements; therefore, these LEDs have a far smaller total cost of
ownership.116 Whatever economic arguments in favor of incandescent
bulbs that may have existed in early days of the EISA regulations when
LEDs were expensive and CFLs unappealing, they have now
disappeared. Nevertheless, for those who prefer their light or who
simply hate change, incandescent bulbs remain available.
Congress did anticipate the possibility of bulb types excluded from
the EISA efficiency requirements being used to evade the regulations.
The EISA contains a provision directing the Secretary of Energy to
monitor sales of excluded bulb types and, if they double in sales relative
to projections, issue a rulemaking setting more stringent efficiency
standards for them. 117 Through 2016, the DOE monitored sales of
excluded types and did not observe sufficient sales growth to issue
regulations. 118 For example, 2015 sales of rough service bulbs exceeded
projections, but only by 35.5%, not enough to trigger a rulemaking. 119
In early 2017, however, the DOE issued a final rulemaking setting
new, more stringent incandescent bulb standards and narrowing the
categories of exempted bulbs.120 Though critics called the regulatory

115. Compare Patrick J. Kiger, Separating Myth From Fact on CFL and LED Light Bulbs: Five
Concerns
Addressed,
NAT.
GEO.
(Jan.
8,
2014),
http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2014/01/08/separating-myth-from-fact-on-cfls-and-leds-fiveconcerns-addressed/comment-page-18/ (estimating price of pre-regulation incandescent bulbs at
$1/bulb); Incandescent Light Bulbs, HOMEDEPOT, http://www.homedepot.com/b/Electrical-LightBulbs-Incandescent-Light-Bulbs/A-Line/N-5yc1vZbmglZ2bcoqwZ1z132pi?NCNI-5 (last visited Mar.
16, 2017) (listing current prices of exempted bulbs; at the time of writing approximately $2-4 for 3-way
bulbs and $2 for rough service bulbs, although clear “traffic light” bulbs remain available for less than
$1/bulb).
116. See Severin Borenstein, Energy Institute at Haas Blog, Trash those incandescent bulbs
today! (Oct. 3, 2016), available at https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2016/10/03/trash-thoseincandescent-bulbs-today/ (estimating savings of $2.39, 80% of purchase cost, for LEDs over
incandescents in the first year alone).
117. See, e.g.,. 42 U.S.C. §6295(i)(4)(D)(2018) (directing Secretary of Energy to monitor sales of
rough service bulbs and regulate if sales increase).
118. See Energy Conservation Program: Data Collection and Comparison With Forecasted Unit
Sales of Five Lamp Types; Notice of data availability, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,261 (Apr. 7, 2016).
119. Id. at § IV(A).
120. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service
Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. 7276 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
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action a “midnight rulemaking” made in anticipation of the change in
administrations,121 the 2007 EISA does require the DOE to issue revised
regulations by January 2017.122 Specifically, the rule discontinues the
rough service bulb exemption, along with those for 3-way incandescent
bulbs, vibration services lamps, and certain specialized lamp types under
40 watts.123 These categories have the largest sales volume among the
exempted categories, 124 suggesting that they are being used as
replacements for general service incandescent bulbs. 125
This rulemaking appears to close the rough service loophole, bringing
the regulations initially implemented by the 2007 EISA somewhat closer
to a true incandescent bulb ban, and it will when and if it enters into
effect in 2020.126 Given the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and his
administration’s anti-regulatory agenda, it seems unlikely that the
rulemaking will ever enter into effect. Moreover, by 2020 LED bulbs
are likely to have fallen further in price and consumer acceptance of
them will likely have grown as well. The policy and political
significance of the bulb efficiency standards, therefore, may decline
substantially.
In short, there never really was a “bulb ban,” or if there was,
consumers and the industry were able to rapidly cooperate to evade it.
As with the gas can regulations, the government was largely unwilling
or unable to prevent such evasion, with the notable exception of the
January 2017 revised standards, should they enter into effect.
D. Environmental and Political Effects
But this does not mean that evasion was widespread—it may have
been limited to a small group of incandescent bulb loyalists. As with the
gas can rules, assessing the extent to which consumer evasion of bulb
efficiency standards undercut the goals of regulation is difficult. But
there is some evidence, and it is mixed on the degree to which
consumers substituted specialty bulbs exempt from the regulation for
traditional incandescent bulbs. The data made public by the Energy

121. See Timothy P. Carney, With midnight regulation, Obama Energy Department just outlawed
your three-way bulb, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/withmidnight-regulation-obama-energy-department-just-outlawed-your-three-way-bulb/article/2612397.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i)(6)(A)(iii).
123. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service
Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7291.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 7288 (“DOE has based its decision on each exemption on an assessment of whether the
exemption encompasses lamps that can provide general illumination and can functionally be a ready
substitute for lamps already covered as [general service lamps]”).
126. Id. at 7276 (“[t]he effective date of this rule is January 1, 2020”).
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Information Administration (EIA) in 2013, as the regulation was
entering into effect, showed a drop in sales of specialty bulbs, rather
than the increase one would expect if consumers were shifting toward
them as standard bulbs were removed from the market. 127

Figure 9128

As the EIA said, “the reduced sales of these incandescent specialty
bulbs could be attributable to market transformation to more efficient
lighting”—in other words, at the same time as the regulation entered
into effect, technological improvements made CFL and LED
alternatives more attractive, reducing demand for specialty incandescent
bulbs at a faster rate than consumer evasion of the efficiency standards
increased it.129 Of course, if such technology-driven market trends
dominate readily available opportunities for consumers to evade
regulation, they draw into question how much of the efficiency
improvement is driven by the bulb regulations at all. Perhaps, however,
regulations were able to shift consumer behavior away from a
suboptimal equilibrium into a mutually-beneficial LED-preferring
equilibrium, or were able to give producers enough confidence in LED
sales to ramp up production and take advantage of economies of scale.
Post-2013 data presents a more mixed picture of exempted bulb sales.
One study reported that incandescent bulbs made up 43% of retail bulb
127. See Sales of specialty incandescent bulbs decline despite exemption from efficiency
standards, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TODAY IN ENERGY (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10631.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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sales in Colorado in 2014 and concluded that many or most of these
were post-regulation specialty bulbs. 130 On the other hand, the same
study showed significant reductions in market share for 75 and 100-watt
incandescent bulbs that were subject to regulation earlier, in 2012 and
2013.131 This suggests that regulation did decrease consumer use of
incandescent bulbs, including specialty bulbs. However, because stocks
of standard incandescent bulbs may have remained available in the years
immediately following imposition of the standards, it is possible that
demand for specialty bulbs only increased after 2013. The more recent
2015 market data cited by the DOE’s 2017 rulemaking suggests
increasing demand for specialty bulbs, up to 35.5% year-on-year for
rough service bulbs. 132
Even if there has not been a persistent increase in the sales of
specialty bulbs, however, there appears to be at least a persistent long
tail of demand for incandescent bulbs given their continued availability
in the market. The size of this market, and therefore the extent to which
it undercuts the efficiency goals of the EISA regulations, may be small,
but it is not trivial.
Despite increasing consumer adoption of efficient LED bulbs,
political fallout from the “bulb ban” persists. A similar EU regulation
limiting sales of incandescent bulbs even became a minor issue in
debates surrounding the UK’s decision to exit the EU. 133 At least one
scholar has cited bulb regulation as an example of regulatory overreach
in a larger critique of the “unbound” administrative state. 134 Regulation
with similar overall economic costs that does not directly affect
consumers rarely gets such attention.
IV. GAMING VEHICLE EMISSIONS TESTS
Perhaps the clearest example of collusion between producers and
consumers to evade consumer-facing environmental regulation comes
from a recent study of fuel economy regulations in the European vehicle
market.135 Partly due to their effect on consumer choice, vehicle
efficiency and emissions standards are among the most high-profile
130. See LAURA JAMES ET AL., COLORADO LIGHTING MARKET STUDY 4 (2016),
https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xe/PDF/Regulatory/CO-DSM/CO-Regulatory-DSM-LightingMarket-Study.pdf .
131. Id. at 24.
132. See Energy Conservation Program: Data Collection and Comparison With Forecasted Unit
Sales of Five Lamp Types; Notice of data availability, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,261 § IV(A) (Apr. 7, 2016).
133. See Worstall, supra note 96.
134. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. Legal Analysis 121
(2016).
135. Reynaert and Sallee, supra note 4.
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environmental regulations. Almost all developed countries have such
standards for light-duty vehicles, as do China, Brazil, and some other
developing countries.136
However, manufacturer compliance with vehicle emissions standards
has often been suspect. To give a few examples, General Motors faced
multimillion-dollar fines and forced recalls of hundreds of thousands of
Cadillacs in 1995 after design features that evaded carbon monoxide
tests were discovered. 137 In the late 1990s, seven heavy truck
manufacturers were hit with over $80 million in fines due to discovery
of devices that shut down emissions controls during highway driving
conditions.138 In 2014, South Korean automakers Hyundai and Kia
settled with the EPA after the firms admitted providing incorrect “road
load force” data to laboratories, leading to inaccurate tests that
overstated fuel economy. 139 Most famously, Volkswagen was busted in
2015 for implementing software in a large number of diesel vehicles that
selectively employed emissions controls in test conditions, but disabled
them in normal driving, increasing fuel economy and performance but
increasing nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions above legal limits. 140
A recent paper by economists Mathias Reynaert and James Sallee
uncovered evidence of yet more cheating (or, as they term it, “gaming”)
of vehicle emissions tests by a wide range of manufacturers subject to
recently imposed European fuel economy standards. 141 Before new fuel
economy standards were imposed in 2007, the data analyzed by the
study showed a modest and stable difference between lab-tested fuel
economy and that in real-world conditions, around 4-18%.142 This
difference increased to over 50% after standards were imposed, a
change best explained by manufacturer gaming; in short, the
manufacturers were designing “to the test” rather than to real-world
conditions.143 Explaining why this might occur, and what implications it
might have for regulatory design in the future, requires a deeper look at
the regulations in question.

136. See
Global
Comparison:
Light-duty
Emissions,
TRANSPORT
POLICY,
http://transportpolicy.net/index.php?title=Global_Comparison:_Light-duty_Emissions.
137. See Jeff Plungis, Carmaker Cheating on Emissions Almost as Old as Pollution Tests,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/carmakercheating-on-emissions-almost-as-old-as-pollution-tests.
138. Id.
139. See Hyundai and Kia Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Nov. 3, 2014),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/hyundai-and-kia-clean-air-act-settlement.
140. See
Learn
About
Volkswagen
Violations,
EPA
(May
19,
2016),
https://www.epa.gov/vw/learn-about-volkswagen-violations.
141. Reynaert and Sallee, supra note 4.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
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A. Private and Public Costs and Benefits of Fuel Economy
Standards
Vehicle standards generally set limits on emissions of certain
pollutants, such as NOx,144 and set minimum fuel economy levels.145
More efficient vehicles emit less pollution, with their greenhouse gas
emissions strongly correlated with fuel economy. 146 In short, regulators
imposed standards because the standards generate public benefits in the
form of reduced air pollution.
Of course, increased fuel economy also has private benefits for
vehicle owners—all else equal, consumers prefer more efficient cars.
But all else is never equal. Fuel economy improvements come at a cost:
more efficient cars may be more expensive up front, as with CFL and
LED light bulbs.147 They may also be less appealing to consumers for
other reasons, such as less attractive styling, slower acceleration, smaller
size and weight, or other factors. 148 For simplicity, these drawbacks of
more efficient cars will be referred to here as “performance.”
Consumers (again, all else equal) prefer more efficient cars, and a
manufacturer offering such vehicles might gain market share, be able to
charge higher prices, or both. Of course, producing more efficient
vehicles requires investment in new technology and designs, cutting into
any profits that might be obtained. If a manufacturer cannot sell a more
efficient car at a price consumers are willing to pay, it will not be
attractive, and the firm could lose profits or market share. Like any
business research and development decision, the best option is rarely
clear.
But if manufacturers can cheat on emissions tests, they can get the
best of both worlds—greater profits and market share without the actual
144. See, e.g., Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks: Clean Fuel Fleet Exhaust Emission
Standards, EPA (March 2016), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100O9ZJ.pdf (detailing
EPA light-duty vehicle emissions standards for NOx, carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and other
pollutants).
145. See Thomas Klier and Joshua Linn, Comparing US and EU Approaches to Regulating
Automotive Emissions and Fuel Economy, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, POLICY BRIEF 16-03 (2016),
http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-PB-16-03.pdf (describing and contrasting US and EU
vehicle fuel economy standards).
146. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,623, 62718 (Oct. 15, 2012) (describing
close relationship between vehicle fuel economy and CO2 emissions). But see id. at 62891 (discussing
10% “rebound effect” of increased emissions due to consumers driving more efficient vehicles more).
147. See, e.g., Nicholas Chase and John Maples, Fuel economy and average vehicle cost vary
significantly across vehicle types, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TODAY IN ENERGY
(July 22, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17211 (estimating price increase of
about $2000 for midsize passenger cars to meet 2025 fuel economy standards).
148. See DONALD WARREN MACKENZIE, TRENDS AND DRIVERS OF THE PERFORMANCE : FUEL
ECONOMY TRADEOFF IN NEW AUTOMOBILES (MIT 2009), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/52758.
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investment in better fuel economy. This would clearly harm consumers
who, believing the false claims of fuel economy, would find the vehicle
more attractive at the time of sale only to find later they have overpaid
for an inferior product. 149
All of this is true regardless of whether testing and labeling is simply
voluntary or required by regulation. One might conclude that
manufacturer cheating on vehicle tests is always detrimental to
consumers as well as the wider public that is harmed by greater
emissions. But this is not necessarily the case. In the presence of
regulatory standards, it may be in consumers’ interest for manufacturers
to cheat.
The reason for this depends on a basic principle: fuel economy
regulations almost always require greater fuel economy than consumers
prefer on their own. If they did not, there would be no reason for the
regulation—market forces alone (assuming rational, informed
consumers) would push fuel economy up to the desired, socially optimal
or at least beneficial level. 150 Therefore, when firms comply with fuel
economy standards, vehicle consumers likely face private costs that
exceed the private benefits of fuel economy, in at least three ways.
First, more efficient cars are likely to be more expensive up front. 151
If this cost exceeds the consumer’s long-term savings from fuel, then
there is a net private cost. Depending on the amount of increase in upfront vehicle costs, this might be true for a broad segment of consumers
or only for those that drive rarely or short distances. Note that the
regulation might still be cost-benefit justified from a social perspective
due to the environmental and health benefits of reduced emissions.
Second, customers with wealth constraints or high discount rates may
prefer vehicles with lower initial costs even if they would achieve longterm savings from reduced fuel use. Finally, as mentioned above, there
is typically a performance-fuel economy tradeoff. 152 Even if consumers’
total cost of ownership over the life of the car (considering initial cost
and fuel) is lower, they may nevertheless be worse off if they are forced
to sacrifice performance characteristics that they value. Consumer utility

149. See, e.g. Ford Fusion and C-MAX Fuel Economy Litigation, Case No 13-MD-2450 (S.D. NY
2013), Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
http://www.girardgibbs.com/wp-content/uploads/Ford-MPG-Complaint.pdf (detailing claims by owners
of hybrid vehicles that Ford allegedly overstated the vehicles’ fuel economy).
150. This argument assumes that consumers are rational. It is possible that consumers would
benefit from more efficient vehicles than they think they prefer (and therefore buy), at least for some
definitions of “benefit.” Compare former Energy Secretary Chu’s claim that light bulb efficiency
standards “tak[e] away a choice that continues to let people waste their own money.” See Tracy , supra
note 88.
151. See, e.g., EIA, supra note 149.
152. See MacKenzie, supra note 148.
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from vehicle performance is much harder to measure than vehicle or
fuel cost, but it is no less real.
Fuel economy rules are therefore likely to impose net private costs on
vehicle buyers. This can mean manufacturer cheating on emissions tests
may be beneficial to consumers. In simplest terms, such cheating allows
customers to opt out of the costly regulation. Vehicles that evade the test
requirements are likely to be initially cheaper, have better performance,
or both compared to those that actually achieve the required fuel
economy. Volkswagen’s infamous NO x test evasion is an example of
this: meeting NOx emissions requirements under lab conditions but then
disabling NOx controls under real-world conditions, allowed affected
VW vehicles to offer performance and fuel economy at a price point that
competitors found impossible to match. 153
If only one firm cheats on emissions tests, it may be able to capture
much of the private benefits for itself. For example, such a firm could
invest less in emissions technology but still sell its cars at market prices,
increasing profits. As another example, it could capture market share or
charge above-market prices by offering higher performance vehicles that
do not actually meet emissions or fuel economy standards. However, if
any one firm cheats and is able to temporarily secure such an advantage,
other firms will have a powerful incentive to cheat as well. Reynaert and
Sallee demonstrate this theory in their paper, modeling a 16% reduction
in profits if a firm is “honest” while its competitors cheat, compared
with a 20% increase in profits if the firm is the only one to cheat. 154 If all
firms cheat, the modeled change in profits is quite small in most
cases. 155 This theory illustrates that widespread cheating allows
consumers to capture more of the benefits of cheaper or betterperforming vehicles.
Considering solely private costs, consumers stand to benefit most
from manufacturer cheating if they can identify which manufacturers are
cheating, and by how much. Consumers may in fact be able to do so, at
least to some extent. They are not limited to rigid testing procedures,
and may have real-world knowledge that regulators lack. Independent
reviews of vehicle fuel economy and performance, word-of-mouth
information, or information obtained from salespeople may give
consumers a more accurate picture of true vehicle performance, fuel

153. See Jeff S. Bartlett, Michelle Naranjo, and Jeff Plungis, Consumer Reports, Guide to the
Volkswagen
Emissions
Recall
(Jan.
6,
2017),
available
at
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/guide-to-the-volkswagen-dieselgate-emissions-recall(detailing independent testing showing a decline in fuel economy and acceleration when “cheat” mode
was enabled on affected VW cars).
154. Reynaert, supra note 4) at 35.
155. Id.
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economy, and relevant tradeoffs than data from regulators’ tests.
Consumers also have access to aggregated real-world data. For example,
consumers have access to crowd-sourced data through services like
Fuelly, which provides a platform for vehicle owners to track their fuel
economy and view aggregated reports on a per-model and permanufacturer basis.156 However, consumers can benefit from
manufacturer cheating even if they are unaware of its extent. At least
assuming cheating is widespread, consumers will have more vehicles to
choose from with greater performance at lower cost.
Of course, some consumers may be disappointed to discover that their
vehicles do not perform as promised, at least in terms of fuel economy,
but also in emissions terms if the consumer has green preferences. 157
Even a consumer who openly prefers a less-efficient but cheaper or
better-performing vehicle would surely prefer to be able to rely on
manufacturers’ stated performance information. But when regulation
makes a consumers’ preferred fuel economy/performance/price
effectively illegal, the ability to buy a vehicle that matches those
preferences despite falsely claiming to meet the standards will be
appealing to many.158 In short, vehicle standards motivate manufacturers
and consumers to collude to evade the regulation.
The tests themselves create an opportunity to do so. Typically,
compliance with standards is enforced by testing each model of vehicle
before it can be sold, rather than by post-sale real-world emissions
testing. Laboratories conducting tests are generally privately owned and
often financed by vehicle manufacturers, although they must obtain
certification from regulators. 159 Laboratories also test vehicles in
narrowly specified conditions in an effort to achieve consistent and
comparable results.160 This testing regime, however, lends itself to abuse
or gaming. It is possible for manufacturers to evade regulation if they

156. See
Fuelly.com,
Aggregated
User
Vehicle
Data,
available
at
http://docs.fuelly.com/aggregated-user-vehicle-data.
157. By green preferences, I mean consumer’s private utility function has internalized some or all
of the emissions externality.
158. In other words, for at least some consumers the disutility from being lied to or the increased
search costs to find a vehicle with preferred real-world performance characteristics will be smaller than
the utility gain from buying a vehicle that avoids the costs of regulation. This disutility disappears if
consumers are able to easily discover the true characteristics of a vehicle before purchase.
159. See Peter Mock and John German, International Council on Clean Transportation, The
Future of Vehicle Emissions Testing and Compliance How to Align Regulatory Requirements, Customer
Expectations, and Environmental Performance in The European Union, White Paper (Nov. 2015) at 915,
available
at
http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_future-vehicletesting_20151123.pdf (detailing the common practice among EU member states of licensing private
testing laboratories, and EPA’s practice of relying on internal manufacturer tests plus government
testing of about 15% of vehicles).
160. Id. (describing lab testing conditions).
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can achieve emissions or fuel economy standards in the lab
environment, regardless of their vehicles’ ability to do so on the road.
Examples of such gaming are common. 161
It is worth noting the obvious reason why evasion of vehicle
standards is a problem, despite its apparent benefits for both
manufacturers and consumers. Vehicle emissions have a social welfare
cost, to the extent that they damage health and the environment.
Assuming that emissions regulations are socially beneficial, evasion
reduces social welfare. Consumers get the cars they want; manufacturers
may get higher revenues and profits; but respiratory disease cases
increase and climate change is exacerbated. If everyone cheats, the tests
become an administratively complex and costly form of theater. Even if
only some cheat, the benefits of the regulation are reduced and the
credibility of regulators is undercut.
B. Evidence of Cheating on European Fuel Economy Tests
Does such cheating actually happen in practice? Is it widespread?
Reynaert and Sallee claim that the answer to both questions is yes, based
on analysis of real-world and reported emissions data.162 Their analysis
compares the stated fuel economy of a wide range of vehicle models
based on lab test results with real-world fuel economy data obtained
from a database of Dutch vehicles. 163 The data covers the period
between 2004-2015 with cars dating back to the 1998 model year, a
particularly useful range because the EU imposed mandatory vehicle
fuel economy standards in 2008; before 2008, testing was mandatory but
only voluntary standards were in place. 164 The dataset, therefore,
includes both pre-regulation and post-regulation data, making it a good
natural experiment.
The study found that lab tested fuel economy for 1998-2006 modelyear vehicles—those produced before mandatory fuel economy
standards—was quite close to their on-road fuel economy, differing only
around 5% in most years, as evinced in Figure 10.165 For 2007-2009
model-year cars—those produced as the fuel economy regulations enter
into effect—this average increases, with the difference between lab
tested and on-road fuel economy growing rapidly for some firms (up to
161. See Russell Hotten, BBC News, Volkswagen scandal: Are car emissions tests fit for
purpose? (Sep. 24, 2015), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34340301 (detailing highly
specific lab testing conditions and opportunities for manufacturer gaming, including removal of wipers,
mirrors, and spare tires, and taping doors to reduce drag).
162. Reynaert, supra note 4 at 1.
163. Id. at 17-18.
164. Id. at 15-16.
165. Id. at 3.
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over 30%).166 2010-2014 model year vehicles show very large
differentiation between lab tested and on-road fuel economy, up to 45%
for some manufacturers and with no manufacturer lower than about
20%, as demonstrated in Figure 11.167

Figure 10: On-road and lab tested (official) fuel consumption by vehicle release
year168

Reynaert and Sallee concluded that these observations were strong
indicators of manufacturers cheating on lab tests after the imposition of
mandatory fuel economy standards in 2008. 169 Some difference between
laboratory and on-road fuel economy is expected, but it is difficult to
explain why this would increase so dramatically after 2008 if it was not
due to industry manipulation of the tests. As Reynaert and Sallee stated,
“[t]he rise in the performance gap implies that around 65% of the gains
in fuel economy as measured by laboratory tests are false.”170 Reynaert
and Sallee further argued that these results were consistent with
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
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independent research suggesting, and media reports on manufacturer
cheating.171
The authors considered and rejected a few alternative explanations,
such as a “rebound effect” might lead to customers driving less
economically (perhaps by using air conditioning more often), eroding
fuel economy gains and in the process widening the difference between
lab and real-world fuel economy. 172 By cleverly using comparisons with
diesel vehicles exempt from the fuel economy regulations, they found
no evidence for such an effect.173 The 2007-2009 period was particularly
interesting, in that test results and on-road fuel economy diverged
significantly for only some manufacturers. This suggests that these firms
began cheating on the tests before their competitors, with other firms
catching on, or succumbing to competitive pressure to cheat, only in the
2010-2014 period.

Figure 11: Gap between on-road and official fuel consumption by vehicle
manufacturer174

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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C. Environmental and Political Effects
For Reynaert and Sallee, this cheating (or, as they are careful to call
it, “gaming”) behavior by manufacturers is an illustration of
“Goodhart’s Law”—the maxim that “when an economic measure
becomes the target of regulation, its measurement accuracy is eroded by
strategic manipulation.”175 A strong interpretation of Goodhart’s Law
can lead to policy nihilism, but even if one does not go that far the
manipulation it implies can severely undercut policy goals. As noted
above, Reynaert and Sallee estimate that 65% of the improvement in
fuel economy of European vehicles attributed to the 2008 fuel economy
standards was in fact the illusory result of manufacturers cheating on the
tests.176 At a social cost of carbon of $40/ton, the fuel economy
standards generate $1.2 billion less in annual benefits due to cheating. 177
However, as discussed above, individual vehicle buyers likely benefit
from this cheating. It is unclear to what extent buyers may know or
suspect that on-road fuel economy of vehicles will not match
manufacturers’ claims, much less the degree to which consumers may
be aware that this gap has increased in recent years. But, as noted,
consumers need not be aware of cheating to benefit from it. Cheating
allows manufacturers to supply vehicles with better performance (in
terms of factors other than fuel economy), very likely at a lower price
than models that actually met the standards under road conditions.
Consumers could demand vehicles that actually have real-world fuel
economy that matches or approaches stated and required fuel economy,
but they do not appear to be doing so. 178 Whether they are aware of it or
not, consumers and manufacturers are effectively able to cooperate to
substantially avoid the EU fuel economy rules. In addition to the loss in
public benefits from emissions reductions, this risks undercutting
regulators’ credibility, especially considering the high-profile discovery
of evasion of similar lab tests for NOx emissions by Volkswagen in
2015.
V. IMPLICATIONS
These case studies provide three examples of evasion of
environmental regulations benefiting manufacturers and product

175. Id. at 1.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id.
178. It is possible that consumer preferences will change if the degree of manufacturer evasion
becomes widely known, but there is little evidence of such a change 6-8 years after the regulation
entered into effect.
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consumers while reducing broader environmental and health benefits
(sometimes substantially). The level of cooperation between consumers
and the industry, and the degree of evasion vary, however. In the case of
gas can regulations, there is strong evidence of widespread evasion of
the regulations and some evidence of industry-consumer cooperation in
such efforts, although there is only modest evidence of major
manufacturers producing products to evade the rules. With light bulbs,
in contrast, there is open marketing of products circumventing the
incandescent ban by major manufacturers (rough-service bulbs) to
holdout consumers, but this market appears to be small, with little effect
on overall efficiency gains (perhaps because CFLs and LEDs have
become dominant regardless of regulation). The Reynaert and Sallee
study provides evidence of widespread and significant evasion of a
major environmental regulation, benefiting vehicle manufacturers and
consumers at the expense of the public, although evidence of consumer
knowledge of the degree of evasion is mixed.
In each of these cases, there are two costs of evasion. One, as noted,
is reduced benefits of regulation, i.e., more pollution than anticipated.
This reduction in benefits can be large: for evasion of the European
vehicle fuel economy standards, Reynaert and Sallee foudn that 65% of
alleged benefits were not realized due to evasion. 179 Similar data for gas
can and light bulb regulations is not available, but anecdotal evidence
suggests widespread evasion that necessarily means at least some
reduction in benefits. More quantitative study of the effects of consumer
evasion of regulation is undoubtedly needed.
There is another, deeper risk of consumer-facing regulation: reduced
political credibility. As vividly illustrated by consumer complaints about
gas can and light bulb regulations, environmental rules that directly
affect consumers may inspire greater pushback and dissatisfaction than
“traditional” environmental regulations focused on large firms with
similar economic costs, as traditionally calculated. When consumerfacing regulations are evaded, not only has a regulator expended
political capital to implement an underperforming rule, it also risks
undercutting its long-run credibility.
Consumers who fumble with new gas cans and spill fuel, who see
their neighbors hacking their cans to add vents or repurposing water
cans for fuel, who see incandescent bulbs available in stores despite a
“ban”, and who conclude that car fuel economy tests are not credible are
all unlikely to take environmental regulations or regulators seriously.
This plays into preexisting critiques of environmental regulators as
meddling and incompetent bureaucrats, solidifying that narrative to an

179. Reynaert, supra note 4 at 3.
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extent that may be difficult to counteract no matter how much evidence
of regulatory successes elsewhere is offered. This is exacerbated further
if consumers are not aware of evasion, even if they privately benefit
from it; consumers assume regulation is effective, and may blame
regulators for problems with products or for price increases, while
manufacturer evasion undercuts the regulation’s environmental benefits.
If consumers then discover the evasion, they may add incompetence to
their list of complaints about regulators, but they are unlikely to
retroactively lift blame from regulators for product and price complaints.
In democracies, political creditability of administrative agencies and
other regulators matters. Elected officials are unlikely to fund or give
regulatory powers to agencies that are not trusted and respected by the
electorate. Agencies also depend on support from the executive and the
judiciary for effective regulation, and both may be influenced by public
views.
To be clear, none of this is to suggest that there should necessarily be
less regulation overall, or even that consumer-facing regulation is
always unwise. When CARB, and later the EPA, decided to regulate gas
cans, they were, by all evidence, generally doing what good regulators
should: continually updating their regulations in response to new
information and choosing the regulatory tool and target based on their
best cost/benefit estimation. This Article’s critique here is narrower:
regulators are less likely to accurately anticipate the economic,
administrative, and political costs associated with consumer-facing
regulation, and are, therefore, likely to find it more attractive in costbenefit terms than it really should be. The next section addresses how
regulators can respond to these challenges.
VI. WHAT C AN REGULATORS DO?
In short, regulations with direct (i.e. non-price) effects on consumers
both create disproportionate political opposition and opportunities for
consumers and industry to collude to evade them, reducing public
benefits. This does not mean, however, that regulators should avoid
consumer-facing regulations entirely. Consumer products and the
choices consumers make between them can and do have serious
consequences, with road vehicle purchase decisions being the most
obvious environmental example. Eschewing regulation of these products
entirely is probably unrealistic; but regulators can do more to avoid
unintentionally creating incentives for consumers and industry to evade
such regulations. This section discusses ways that regulators can do so
by changing the tools they use or the target of their regulations. It is
worth noting at the outset, however, that none of these solutions is

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/5

42

Richardson: Social License to Regulate: Consumer-Producer Collusion and Relat

2018]

SOCIAL LICENSE TO REGULATE

195

perfect—all have drawbacks of their own that may overwhelm their
advantages in terms of reducing incentives to evade. Unsurprisingly,
regulators face tough choices. The goal here is merely to discuss how a
previously undervalued factor—incentives to collaboratively evade
regulation, and the political consequences thereof—should play into
regulator decision-making.
A. Attack Evasion Directly
One option is for regulators to directly regulate attempted evasion and
collusion . Doing so is a standard feature of regulation, both when
initially written and continually through the life of a rule. But countering
evasion requires administrative resources, imposes political costs, and
can never be perfect.
To the extent that regulators anticipate an easy method of evasion,
they will likely address it in the initial regulation. Vehicle safety
regulations not only require seatbelts, but also require alerts that flash or
sound if the car is driven without seatbelts buckled, which cannot be
easily disabled by drivers.180 Product-design regulations themselves can
be seen as regulatory attempts to block easy routes of consumer evasion.
For example, in response to the VOC emissions problem from gas cans
the EPA and CARB could have regulated gas can use rather than design,
perhaps by requiring users to keep vents closed when pouring gas, or to
buy and install replacement low-emissions spouts. Regulators likely
concluded that such measures would be less effective than requiring
low-emissions can designs because use regulations would be easily
evaded and impossible to enforce against a large number of consumers.
If it is impossible to regulate how a product is used, regulating its
design, and therefore limiting customer choice, becomes much more
attractive, and may be the only realistic option available to regulators.
Regulators cannot anticipate all evasion in advance, however, and,
therefore, must often respond to evasion they discover only after
regulations are issued. A variety of regulator strategies are available
here. Many regulations do not explicitly ban circumvention attempts,
forcing regulators to revise the rules as consumers discover ways to
evade them. CARB’s decision to revise its regulations to include cans
labeled for kerosene and so-called utility cans are examples of such
responses.181 Regulators may eventually decide to regulate cans labeled

180. See 49 C.F.R. §571.208 S7.3 (requiring audible or visual alert car is started without seatbelts
fastened).
181. See California Air Resources Board, New Requirements for Kerosene Containers (Oct 2005),
available at https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs338.pdf, California Air Resources Board, Clarified
Requirements for Utility Jugs (Dec. 2005), available at https://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/advs/advs342.pdf.
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for water use in the same way, or to ban aftermarket gas can
modification kits. These ex-post efforts undoubtedly reduce evasion to
some extent, but they are a “red queen’s race”—there is no limit to
consumer ingenuity.
Alternatively, some statutes and regulations forbid attempts to evade.
The most well-known of such limitations is probably the Clean Air
Act’s ban on “defeat devices.”182 Of course, forbidding evasion does not
mean it will not happen, however, as the repeated violations of the
defeat device provision described above vividly illustrate. Regulators
must verify manufacturer compliance, usually through government or
third-party testing requirements. Such testing adds to the cost of
regulation, and may still be ineffective at detecting evasion, as
evidenced by Reynaert and Sallee’s study of emissions cheating in the
European auto market suggests. Here too, there is an iterative arms race
between regulators and manufacturers.
Ever more onerous regulations and testing requirements also likely
increase the political cost of regulation. Anti-evasion designs may prove
ever more unfriendly to users. Regulators may cause collateral
damage—kerosene cans were initially unregulated, presumably because
CARB determined the cost of doing so was not worth the benefits. But
after kerosene cans were included in revised regulations to prevent
evasion of the gas can standards, users of kerosene cans were subjected
to the same frustrating designs. The light bulb regulations attempted to
avoid this collateral damage problem by exempting “rough service” and
other specialized bulbs, but at the cost of leaving open an easy route for
regulatory evasion.
As these examples illustrate, regulators face tough choices. Fail to
address evasion, and the benefits of regulation may be rapidly eroded, if
they are ever realized at all. But zealous pursuit of evasion may carry
large administrative and political costs, as well as increasing the
economic cost of regulations beyond the optimal level. Reputational
factors matter too: regulators want to earn a reputation for being tough
but fair, so as to deter cheating while promoting compliance.
None of this is easy, and as the gas can regulations illustrate, a
process of continual revision of regulations and testing requirements is
necessary. Such regular revision is difficult enough for regulators, but
may effectively be impossible where standards are set by legislatures.

182. See 42 U.S.C. §7522(a)(3)(A) (illegal to “manufacture or sell, or offer to sell, or install, any
part or component intended for use with, or as part of, any motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine, where
a principal effect of the part or component is to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative any device or
element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance with
regulations”).
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B. Adopt More Flexible Regulatory Tools
Another option available to regulators anticipating evasion of
consumer-facing regulation is to change regulatory tools. Much
consumer-facing regulation is traditional command-and-control.
CARB’s initial ban on vented gas cans is a typical example. But other
regulatory tools are available: performance standards or externality
pricing might be more cost-effective while also reducing administrative
and political costs by preserving some degree of consumer (and
manufacturer) choice. They are not without important drawbacks,
however.
1. Performance Standards
Performance standards, as the name indicates, require a specified
level of performance, rather than adoption of a particular design or
practice as command-and-control regulation would require. For
example, a factory might be required to emit no more than a specified
amount of a pollutant under a performance standard, rather than
installing a regulator-specified scrubber device under a command-andcontrol rule. Performance standards also have a number of advantages.
They are more responsive to differing on-the-ground circumstances (or,
conversely, less sensitive to regulators’ lack of good information); and
they maintain incentives to innovate: if techniques can be found for
complying with regulation at lower cost or while maintaining or
improving other performance metrics, they will be adopted.
In the context of consumer-facing regulations, the advantages of
performance standards over command-and-control are readily apparent.
Faced with command-and-control product design standards,
manufacturers have no choice but to supply compliant products, even if
consumers find them less useful. If regulations are performance
standards, however, manufacturers can innovate to produce products
with better performance and utility that still meet the standards.
Many consumer-facing regulations recognize this benefit of
performance standards, including of course the largest such program—
vehicle emissions standards. Vehicle manufacturers must only ensure
their vehicle fleets comply with the emissions standards; they are free to
innovate on vehicle design, performance, and efficiency. The result has
been steady improvement in vehicles across many dimensions important
to consumers while (usually) complying with standards that have
tightened over time. The 2007 EISA also used performance standards to
regulate light bulbs, with an additional and common wrinkle: the
standards increased over time, allowing manufacturers time to innovate
and consumers time to adapt. Even gas can regulations have moved
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toward performance standards as well, with CARB’s revised regulations
eschewing command-and-control in favor of a performance standard. In
short, all three of the regulatory programs discussed above began as
performance standards or evolved in that direction.
This evolution, however, illustrates a limitation of performance
standards. Where evolution has occurred, it is not clear that the
performance standards were meaningfully different from the earlier
command-and-control rules—there is little apparent evidence of
improved gas can designs that comply with the performance standards
but which would have been illegal under the original command-andcontrol rules. If performance standards are too strict, or if there are
simply no options available for manufacturers to innovate, then they are
effectively indistinguishable from command-and-control rules. Put
simply, if there’s only one way to achieve the standard (e.g., removing
secondary vents from gas cans) then the regulation is effectively a
command-and-control rule requiring that approach. It is the flexibility
inherent in well-designed performance standards, not their form alone,
that gives them their advantages.
Moreover, enforcement of performance standards is more difficult.
Instead of simply verifying whether designs meet stated command-andcontrol requirements, regulators must test them for compliance with the
standards. These tests may be expensive, with costs likely borne by
manufacturers and, ultimately, by consumers. As the experience with
vehicle emissions standards shows, these tests are themselves vulnerable
to cheating and evasion. Testing regimes can and should be improved;
but here too there are drawbacks. For example, EPA’s gas can emissions
tests require all vents to be open during testing, on the assumption that
customers are likely to leave them open in actual use. 183 This testing
requirement effectively bans vents because meeting the performance
standards with open vents is impossible, at least for current designs. In
this way, strict testing requirements, just like strict performance
standards, effectively become command-and-control requirements. To
consumers, the two are indistinguishable. In fact, if there is enough
cheating or if administrative costs of testing are sufficiently high,
command-and-control regulation might be superior, i.e., both more costeffective and no less likely to promote evasion and consumer discontent.
More broadly, advising regulators to move toward performance
standards for consumer-facing regulation is not that helpful for the
simple reason that such regulations already are performance standards.
To put it a different way, regulating with performance standards may
reduce incentives to evade regulation and their political cost, but

183. See EPA PFC Rule at 8500.
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persistent evasion and consumer discontent show it clearly cannot
eliminate either problem.
2. Pricing Externalities
An even more flexible regulatory option is for regulators to simply
price the negative externality a regulation is intended to address. Instead
of limiting harmful conduct directly with command-and-control
regulations, such an approach permits the conduct, so long as the
regulated parties are willing to pay. The two simplest forms of such
regulation are Pigouvian taxes and cap-and-trade. Under the former, the
regulator sets a price for the externality (such as units of emissions) that
must be paid. Under the latter, the regulator fixes a quantity and allows
trading of credits totaling that fixed quantity, with the market setting the
credit’s price. In simplest terms, therefore, the regulator either sets the
price or quantity of the externality. Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade for
greenhouse gases are the most well-known examples of these regulatory
tools, but they are not necessarily restricted to large-scale air pollution.
In principle, regulators could tax the sale price of vehicles based on
their emissions performance, rather than forbidding sale of those that
fail to meet performance standards. Or, in a crude version of cap-andtrade, CARB could allow sales of only a limited number of vented gas
cans per year, with the market setting their price. Hybrid performance
standard/externality pricing approaches are also possible. For example,
the EPA could set a target fleet average fuel economy for vehicle
manufacturers, but let manufacturers trade credits to meet it (with overcomplying manufacturers trading credits to those that fail to meet the
target). This, in fact, is more or less how the EPA’s current fuel
economy standards work.184
To an even greater extent than a similarly stringent performance
standard, externality pricing incentivizes innovation and preserves
consumer choice. If a manufacturer can design a more efficient light
bulb, lower-emissions gas can, or cleaner vehicle, it can pay lower taxes
or buy fewer credits. These savings may be passed on to consumers.
Similarly, a consumer that strongly prefers an old-style vented gas can
would still be able to buy one under a tax, but would have to pay more
for it than for an unvented low-emissions can. Consumers that love the
warm glow of incandescent light bulbs, or need their heat for an EasyBake oven, could still buy them, but at a higher price than they would
184. See Benjamin Leard and Virginia A. McConnell, New Markets Under US Vehicle Fuel
Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Standards: Credit Trading, Resources (Sep. 24, 2015), available at
http://www.rff.org/research/publications/new-markets-under-us-vehicle-fuel-efficiency-and-greenhousegas-standards (describing how modern fleet fuel economy standards allow inter-manufacturer trading).
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have paid before the pricing regulation. Consumers would surely
grumble about price increases, but, as discussed above, restricting
choice by regulation seems to inspire much greater dissatisfaction than
mere price increases.
Externality pricing may also reduce incentives to evade regulation.
For example, Reynaert and Sallee showed that car manufacturers would
have had no incentive to cheat on EU emissions regulations had they
come in the form of higher fuel taxes (Europe’s traditional approach)
rather than US-style emissions standards.185 As they said, “gaming
offers an opportunity to avoid a regulation but not a fuel tax, which
breaks the symmetry and provides an enforcement rationale for
preferring the tax over a regulation.” 186 To illustrate why, consider the
standard example of cheating: a manufacturer that produces a vehicle
with lower actual fuel economy than indicated by lab testing, but better
performance or a lower cost to the manufacturer than would be possible
if the vehicle truly had the tested fuel economy. Under a performance
standard, the vehicle slips through the testing, and consumers can get a
vehicle they prefer (because of its lower price or better performance) but
would not otherwise be able to buy. With a fuel tax instead of a
performance standard, however, all customers get is a vehicle with
greater cost of operation than was apparent when they bought it. Sure,
the vehicle does have better performance or lower cost, but in the
absence of the performance standard, customers could have just
purchased such a vehicle with those characteristics and with accurate
information on fuel economy. In short, what was mutually beneficial
consumer-producer collusion under a performance standard becomes
consumer-harming false advertising under a fuel tax.
Note that in principle the regulator, acting on behalf of the public in
general, is indifferent between the two options—the goal is reduced
emissions, not a particular mix of vehicles on the road or price of fuel.
Therefore, if one option is subject to not only cheating but also collusive
(and presumably more lucrative) cheating, and the other is not, that is an
important advantage for the latter.
This advantage is not necessarily dispositive, however. Externality
pricing has its disadvantages, and is ill-suited to some types of
externalities. Most obviously, externality pricing still requires similar
compliance testing to performance standards. If high-emitting vehicles
or gas cans are subject to a tax, for example, regulators must still test
vehicles and gas cans to determine their emissions and, therefore, their
tax. These tests are as equally subject to manufacturer evasion (though

185. Reynaert, supra note 4 at 12.
186. Id.
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not consumer-producer collusive evasion) as those for performance
standards.
Moreover, incentives to evade may remain after products have been
sold and the tax paid. The above discussion of fuel taxes shows that such
incentives may be reduced, but they do not go away entirely. For
example, if old-style vented gas cans are taxed—making them more
expensive than new-style cans—some consumers may still buy the
cheaper new-style cans and modify them to evade the regulation. Instead
of modifying the cans to get features barred by regulation, they would
be modifying them to avoid the tax. To be sure, it will not be worth the
time, the effort, and the cost (the “No-Bama” aftermarket vent kit retails
for $13.95 plus shipping)187 for many consumers to modify untaxed
new-style cans. However, these consumers presumably would also not
evade command-and-control regulations by modifying cans.
It is also possible that evasion of a tax has a different moral valence
or reputational effect than avoiding a command-and-control rule.
Avoiding traditional income tax and other taxes is widely seen as
freeloading—failing to pay one’s fair share of the benefits of
government. In principle, avoiding externality taxes should be seen the
same way—failing to pay for the costs one’s behavior imposes on
others. Avoiding minor regulations, from speed limits to gas can
modifications, seems not to carry the same social stigma, even if those
rules are similarly aimed at reducing costs imposed on others (risk of
traffic accidents or VOC pollution, respectively).
The perceptive reader will have noted some tension between the
previous paragraph and Reynaert and Sallee’s claim, discussed above,
that switching to a fuel tax would eliminate manufacturer’s incentive to
cheat on emissions standards. Does externality pricing eliminate evasion
incentives or not? The answer, of course, is that it depends, for reasons
discussed further in the next subsection. Some other points about
externality pricing are worth making first, however.
Another problem is that the target price or quantity can be difficult for
regulators to determine. This is true generally; it is hard to know what
level of tax will lead to sufficient emissions reductions to achieve
desired benefits, or how low to set an emissions cap without driving up
credit prices so high that the regulation’s costs exceed its benefits. There
are also specific reasons why externality pricing for consumer products
is difficult.
The largest such problem is monitoring. Regulators generally can
only interact with consumer decisions at the time of purchase. An

187. No-Bama Replacement Spout & Vent Kit, alaskansongs.com,
http://alaskansongs.com/product/no-bama-replacement-spout-vent-kit/.
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emissions tax is paid, if at all, when a product (say a gas can or light
bulb) is initially bought.188 There is no practical way for a regulator to
monitor use or emissions through a product’s life, and adjust the tax
accordingly, even though the externality imposed may differ greatly
between consumers. A gas can used daily by a landscaping company is
likely to lead to much greater VOC emissions, for example, than a can
used only once a year for an emergency generator. The efficiency
benefits of a light bulb in a light that stays on most of the time are far
greater than those for, say, a closet light that is used a few hours a year.
The best regulators can do for consumer products is to set the tax based
on an estimate of average usage. However, consumers have better
information and will act on it. The landscaper is much more likely to
pay the tax for an old-style gas can than the generator user, and will,
therefore, have much higher VOC emissions. Taxes on large industrial
emitters, rather than consumers, do not generally have these problems
because regulators can monitor emissions and tax them on an ongoing
basis, rather than by estimating in advance.
Externality pricing may also be a poor fit for some regulatory goals.
For example, if the purpose of regulation is paternalistic or is to mitigate
impacts of customers’ bounded rationality, rather than externalityreducing, pricing will not work. Take seatbelts, for example. Allowing
customers to buy a car without seatbelts (or with the ability to disable
seatbelt alarms) on payment of a tax defeats the purpose of the
regulation. Light bulb efficiency standards might arguably be justified
on the grounds that they save consumers money in the long run, but that
consumers’ irrationally high discount rates or status-quo biases prevent
them from appreciating and realizing these savings. If so, allowing
customers to escape the efficiency standards by paying a higher price on
incandescent bulbs due to a tax might make the problem worse. The
price increase might cause some customers to reassess their decision and
buy a more efficient CFL or LED, while others might just keep buying
the same bulbs they always have and pay more for them. 189
A final and more practical drawback of externality pricing is that
traditional regulatory statutes often do not give regulators the authority
to implement them. The Clean Air Act, for example, generally allows
the EPA only to set health or technology-based regulations and
standards, although it does allow states to use market-based tools to

188. More likely, it is paid when the product is produced, with the cost then passed on to the
consumer at the time of sale.
189. Of course, consumers who persist in buying incandescent bulbs might not be irrational at all,
rather they may have rational reasons not considered by regulators, like high perceived search costs—
i.e., they hate shopping or change—or a preference for incandescent bulb characteristics other than
efficiency.
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comply with EPA standards.190 This means legislative action is likely
necessary for regulators to adopt large-scale externality pricing for
consumer-facing regulation.
3. Change the Point of Compliance
If fuel taxes make cheating on emissions standards less attractive,
why do taxes on gas cans necessarily make aftermarket consumer
modifications similarly unattractive? The answer is that there is a bit of
sleight-of-hand in the fuel tax example. Switching from vehicle
emissions standards to a fuel tax involves both a change in regulatory
tool (performance standard to Pigouvian tax) and a shift in the
regulation’s point of compliance (from manufacturers to fuel sellers or,
practically, to consumers themselves).
It is the latter shift that is doing most of the work in making evasion
less attractive. Neither consumers nor manufacturers have much ability
to avoid a fuel tax. More precisely, they do not have any way to avoid it
without also reducing their emissions and thereby fulfilling the goals of
the regulation—manufacturers can make more efficient vehicles, and
consumers can drive less, but neither is “evasion” in any meaningful
sense.
In contrast, regulations on product design—whether command-andcontrol, performance standards, or taxes—can be evaded. Manufacturers
may produce designs that evade regulators’ tests, possibly colluding
with consumers to do so, or consumers may evade the regulations on
their own by making post-sale (and therefore post-testing)
modifications. This difference arises from two facts. First, fuel
consumption (for vehicles or for fuel stored in cans) is closely correlated
with emissions, much more so than vehicle or can design is. Second, as
discussed above, tests of designs can be evaded while measurements of
fuel consumption generally cannot (black-market fuel purchases aside).
As noted above, externality prices on product designs are necessarily
based on an estimate of the externality imposed by use of a product,
which can vary greatly among users. It is often impossible to measure
the externalities imposed by consumer products on an ongoing basis.
But in some cases this measurement is possible—most obviously when
the externalities come not from the use of the product itself, but from the
consumption (or waste through evaporation) of the fuel. It is gasoline,
and the pollutants it contains or produces on combustion, that is the
190. See 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(A) (directing states to include “enforceable emission limitations”
in their state plans for compliance with federally-set air quality standards, and further defining such
emission limitations to include “economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of
emissions rights”).
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environmental problem addressed by vehicle and gas can fuel standards.
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that regulating gasoline directly
(through fuel taxes) should prove a more effective regulatory tool.
To generalize, regulators may reduce both incentives to evade
regulation and a great deal of the political and administrative costs of
consumer-facing rules by shifting the regulatory point of compliance
closer to the source of the externality. This intuition is applicable
beyond gasoline. For example, a tax on electricity might better
incentivize customers to switch to more efficient light bulbs (and other
appliances). Such a tax would be suboptimal, however, because it is not
electricity itself but the pollution associated with its generation that
leads to negative externalities. Taxes, therefore, on the production or
combustion of polluting fuels in proportion to their environmental
impact (most notably coal) would almost certainly be more costeffective, easier to administer, and more politically acceptable than light
bulb phase-outs. Of course, such taxes would increase the cost of
electricity for consumers, but without restricting consumer choice.
While pricing fuel externalities appears to be a better choice than the
three consumer-facing regulations discussed here, it is no panacea.
Many externality problems do not have such ready opportunities to shift
the point of regulation. Take, for example, regulations aimed at reducing
water usage. Design regulations such as low-flow toilets and
showerheads are one option, but another is to increase the price of water
delivered to homes. That may work in cities, but in rural areas that use
well water there is no easy way to tax overall water consumption. Other
externality problems, like discarded plastic bags, lack any clear point of
compliance other than the product itself.
Moreover, different uses of the same fuel may have very different
environmental costs. The environmental effects of evaporating fuel from
vented gas cans are different from those of combustion byproducts of
burned fuels, and those combustion byproducts vary depending on a
variety of factors, including when and where the emissions occur and
the characteristics of the engine using the fuel. In other words, there is
often no single measure of externalities associated with a fuel, and any
externality price set by regulators will almost certainly be less than the
external costs imposed by some uses. A case for regulating product
designs related to these high-external-cost uses therefore persists, and in
these cases we are back where we started.
C. Pick Your Battles—Or Be More Subtle
There appears to be no way to completely avoid the problems of
consumer-facing regulation. Regulators will always face some risk of
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evasion and some degree of political backlash. Consumer-facing
regulations perhaps inevitably have lower benefits (due to greater
evasion) and higher costs (if political and administrative costs are
included) than equivalent industry-only regulations. An overly simple
response would be for regulators to eschew consumer-facing regulations
entirely. To some extent this has been regulators’ historic approach. Air
pollution regulations initially focused on large stationary sources,
typically operated by large firms. This is likely because regulators
correctly perceived that the administrative, and perhaps also political,
costs of regulating a few large emitters were smaller than regulating
many small sources of emissions, including consumer products.
Over time, however, the lowest-hanging fruit has been picked while
achieving health and environmental benefits continues to require greater
emissions reductions. Regulating so-called “area sources” and consumer
products, therefore, has become more attractive to regulators. 191 This
trend can be clearly seen in California’s efforts to reduce tropospheric
ozone, initially with regulations on point sources, then with vehicle
emissions standards, and eventually with consumer products like paints
and gas cans.
1. Do Not Regulate Consumers at All?
Regulators are not naïve—they are more aware than anyone that it is
easier and less controversial in most cases to regulate a few industry
actors than many consumers and their purchase decisions. But they have
nevertheless concluded in many cases that consumer-facing regulation is
justified, and superior to alternatives that may be available, such as
tighter restrictions on already-regulated industrial sources, or simply not
regulating at all and accepting current health and environmental
conditions.
Some evidence from the case studies above suggests, however, that
regulators may underappreciate the costs of consumer-facing regulation.
Evasion of testing by manufacturers appears common or at least
frequent, and while better testing regimes are surely needed, they may
not be able to substantially reduce evasion without large increases in
regulators’ administrative costs. Enforcement against consumer evasion
(such as home modification of gas cans) seems impractical in most
contexts. Consumer discontent with choice-limiting regulation seems
disproportionately high relative to regulators estimates of program cost.
Regulators could learn from these experiences and update their
191. An alternative, cynical explanation is that some industries were able to organize and exert
sufficient political pressure that caused regulators to conclude that the political costs of consumer-facing
regulation were lower than those for continued industry-facing regulation.
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models and heuristics accordingly. Regulators always anticipate some
degree of enforcement failure, administrative cost, and political backlash
to regulations, and include these costs (formally or informally) in their
decision-making processes. 192 These ex ante cost estimates should be
continually revised based on experience with similar past regulations.
Ideally, it would be possible to predict and quantify lost benefits due to
evasion and increased costs due to higher administrative burdens, and
include these estimates in cost-benefit analysis; however, these may be
difficult to predict with any precision, and political costs may be
impossible to quantify. Regulators do not have it easy, but they do
regularly consider unquantifiable benefits. 193 Perhaps some
psychological costs to consumers in terms of lost choice, forced change
in habits, and other sources of consumer discontent should be treated as
unquantifiable costs and similarly incorporated into regulatory
decisions.
It is unsurprising that regulators appear to underestimate regulatory
costs imposed on consumers. Small costs imposed on many consumers
throughout the economy, each of them using products in idiosyncratic
ways, are likely to be hard to estimate and aggregate. Moreover,
regulators probably do not get reliable information from consumers
during the regulatory process. If regulators propose a rule affecting large
firms or a well-organized industry, they can count on robust
participation from industry in the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process. In theory, this participation will identify any costs or
inefficiencies regulators failed to initially appreciate, and final rules can
be revised accordingly. However, individual consumers are unlikely to
know regulations affecting them and the products they buy have been
proposed, are unlikely to know how to participate in notice-andcomment, and are unlikely to have the resources to or interest in doing
so. Regulators will, therefore, be deprived of information on costs of
consumer-facing regulation that might have led to revisions in final
rules.
Even if one takes a more cynical view of the notice-and-comment
process as merely a venue for rent-seeking behavior, results are similar.
Industry lobbyists will be able to shape rules ex-ante in notice-andcomment (or even through ex parte communications with agency
officials), while consumers will not be able to similarly participate.
Regulators will, therefore, see the political costs of industry regulation
192. See, e.g. 2017 DOE Bulb Standards, supra note 108 at 7291 (revising initial regulations to
foreclose the easiest methods of consumer evasion via substitution of excluded light bulb types, while
maintaining other exclusions despite awareness that some substitution is likely to persist).
193. See, e.g. EPA PFC Rule, supra note 1 at 8513 (detailing unquantified health and
environmental benefits from reduced emissions from fuel containers).
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but fail to appreciate those costs for consumer-facing rules. Viewed in
this way, loud consumer dissatisfaction in response to choice-restricting
rules can be seen as the ex-post rent-seeking equivalent of ex-ante
agency lobbying.
Another view is that under appreciation of the costs of consumerfacing regulation is a symptom of a wider problem: regulators’ general
failure to retrospectively review the effectiveness (costs and benefits) of
past regulations, or, to be more charitable to regulators, executive failure
to lead and legislative failure to direct and fund such efforts. If
regulators rarely or never review past consumer-facing regulations, the
risks and costs of evasion and political backlash are likely to be
underappreciated. If they are understood by regulators, it will likely be
in an anecdotal, institutional memory sense, rather than in any
systematic way, making it hard to apply lessons to future rulemaking.
To make this suggestion more concrete, imagine CARB conducted a
retrospective review of its gas can regulations, including updated
emissions estimates taking into account observed consumer and
consumer-producer evasion, as well as harder-to-quantify lessons like
anecdotal evidence of consumer backlash. Such a review would be
likely to influence CARB’s future marginal decisions on what emissions
sources to regulate. Again, this is not to suggest that CARB would as a
result eschew consumer-facing regulation entirely, but rather that future
decisions on whether to do so would be better informed.
Sometimes such greater appreciation of the costs of consumer-facing
regulation will, however, lead regulators to decide against regulating a
product at all. This does not necessarily mean more air pollution or other
externalities, however; it just means regulators will choose another
target. CARB regulated gas cans because it determined that it was the
most cost-effective way to achieve marginal reductions in VOC air
pollution at the time. CARB could instead have imposed further
regulations on other VOC sources, such as industrial facilities, and
might have done so had it anticipated the extent to which consumers
would evade the gas can rules (or the degree to which consumer/citizens
would be inconvenienced by the rules). Finally, perhaps CARB would
have gone ahead with the gas can rules anyway, but it would have done
so based on better information.
2. Consumer-Transparent Regulation
Another regulatory response is to regulate aspects of consumer
products that are transparent to consumers. If a design characteristic is
completely transparent, it is perceived by consumers only as a price
increase. For example, CARB and the EPA’s gas can regulations
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undoubtedly make gas cans harder to use by requiring complex spouts
and removal of vents. It is end users who must bear this burden, but the
regulations also require gas can manufacturers to use less permeable
materials, thereby reducing the rate at which stored fuel evaporates from
closed containers. Presumably the less permeable materials are more
expensive (or manufacturers would have already used them), so the
permeability regulations probably do drive up the cost of cans
incrementally. But consumers are not otherwise burdened—in contrast
to spout and vent changes, this change is largely or perhaps completely
transparent to consumers. A plastic gas can is more or less a plastic gas
can. It is possible that CARB and the EPA could have achieved the
emissions reductions they predicted from spout and vent changes by
imposing even-stricter permeability standards, or by regulating other
consumer-transparent (or lower-consumer-impact) emissions-reducing
aspects of cans.
3. Subsidies
An even more radical change in regulatory approach would be to
eschew regulation in some cases, at least initially, in favor of
subsidizing research into product features that reduce externalities with
minimal impact on consumers—such as high-quality LED light bulbs or
easy-to-use low-emissions gas can spouts. The Department of Energy,
for example, does subsidize some such efficiency research. Advocates
for regulation will respond that well-designed regulation is technologyforcing, and that pressure from regulation and consumers together over
time will result in products that meet consumer demand while also
minimizing externalities. The success of LED light bulbs and, to some
extent the improvement in vehicle features while emissions have
declined, is evidence of this. For gas cans, however, manufacturers seem
to be unable to replicate the ease of use of traditional cans, and may
never be able to do so. To generalize, it will always be ambiguous ex
ante whether research and development subsidization or regulation is a
more cost-effective means to reduce externalities. In practice, regulators
and the government usually use a mix of the two. Evidence that
consumer-facing regulation is particularly prone to evasion and breeds
consumer discontent (possibly undercutting the social license to
regulate) should be considered when deciding between subsidy and
regulation.
Alternatively, it may be possible to explain part of the apparent
preference (particularly in the US) for subsidy over regulation, despite
its apparent higher cost by reference to un- or under-observed political,
administrative, and enforcement costs of consumer-facing regulation.
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4. Information
In addition to subsidies, regulators have another alternative:
information. Extensive research suggests that providing information to
consumers about products’ environmental effects and other externalities
leads to changes in consumer behavior. Government labeling like
Energy Star or private labeling like that from the Forest Stewardship
Council may be effective. Information is a major component of
regulators’ emissions reduction strategy with road vehicles: federal
regulators require detailed and easily-comprehensible labeling of new
vehicles’ fuel economy. 194 Regulators clearly believe such labeling will
induce or allow consumer purchase decisions with both private (lower
cost of ownership) and public (emissions-reducing) benefits. To be sure,
labeling and other information strategies are unlikely to adequately
address many externality problems alone. However, as with subsidies,
regulators are making decisions at the margin. A regulatory program
that looks superficially superior to an information program may not be
so once the high evasion risk and political cost of consumer-facing
regulation is considered.
To be sure, it is possible for manufacturers to cheat on labeling
requirements too—EPA’s fuel economy labels are based on
standardized test procedures just like its emissions regulations are. But
at least there is no incentive for producer-consumer collusion—as
Reynaert and Sallee demonstrate for a fuel tax, if consumers still have
freedom of choice among designs, manufacturer cheating makes
consumers worse off.
5. Green Defaults
A final alternative option for regulators, suggested by Cass Sunstein
and Lucia Reisch, are so-called “green defaults”—regulations that make
environmentally-friendly “green” options the default for consumers,
forcing them to actively choose dirtier “gray” options. 195 This
suggestion is an extension of Sunstein’s (and Richard Thaler’s) concept
of policy “nudges” capitalizing on humans’ behavioral status-quo
biases, rather than regulatory mandates or subsidies to achieve policy
results. 196 For example, Sunstein & Reisch noted that consumers in most

194. See
EPA,
Gasoline
Vehicles:
Learn
More
About
the
New
Label,
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/label/learn-more-gasoline-label.shtml.
195. See Cass Sunstein and Lucia Reisch, Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and
Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127 (2014).
196. See generally RICHARD THALER AND CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, Penguin Books (2009).
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markets currently receive “gray” electricity generated by the lowest-cost
mix of generation technologies (including fossil fuels) by default, but
may often choose to instead receive “green” renewable energy from the
grid. 197 Their suggestion is to flip this default rule, providing moreexpensive “green” electricity unless consumers specifically request the
cheaper “gray” energy.198
“Green defaults” appear to work best when a third party—a utility,
the government, or a contractor—is providing a service or making a
decision. It is harder to imagine them in contexts where consumers make
specific purchasing decisions, as they usually do for gas cans, light
bulbs and cars. Sunstein & Reisch discussed research indicating that
customers were more likely to adopt CFL light bulbs if they were
presented as a default option by a contractor during a remodeling
project.199 However, hardware stores selling individual bulbs do not, in
most senses of the term, provide a default option for consumers. Perhaps
regulators could require that more efficient bulbs (or low-emissions gas
cans) be given more attractive shelf space, or perhaps the business
model for bulbs could change to a “bulbs-as-a-service” subscription
model, with new bulbs regularly shipped to homeowners. LED bulbs
could then be presented as the default subscription. This would also
have the advantage of presenting the lower lifetime costs of LED bulbs
up front. Still, however, it is not obvious how infrequent purchases like
gas cans could be influenced by a “green default” option. That said,
perhaps a clever regulator would be able to come up with a better way to
impose a “green default” than those suggested here.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Regulators often impose rules that directly affect consumers and the
products they buy. Regulations may ban or substantially restrict sale of
some products like incandescent light bulbs, force major design changes
like removal of vents in gas cans, or force compromise between features
regulators and consumers want, like vehicle emissions, cost, and
performance. Regulators would not implement these regulations if they
had not concluded that benefits (in these cases, environmental benefits)
exceeded regulatory costs. There is evidence from each of these
regulations, however, that regulatory costs are greater than they initially
appear, and that these regulations are not as cost-effective as they appear
on paper.
This is for three reasons. First, many consumers appear eager to evade
197. Sunstein, supra note 195 at 134-137.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 137-138.
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the regulations in an almost infinite variety of ways. Consumers add
vents to new-style unvented gas cans with drills and spare parts,
repurpose unregulated water or kerosene containers for gasoline use, and
hoard pre-ban incandescent bulbs, to give only three examples of
consumers’ evasive creativity. This evasion is either very difficult or
impossible for regulators to prevent, driving up administrative costs and
at least to some extent undercutting regulatory benefits.
Second, consumers and producers effectively collude to avoid some
regulations. Manufacturers may market similar but unregulated products
to consumers, such as “utility jugs,” or may circumvent regulations with
aftermarket modification kits, profiting from and simplifying
consumers’ evasion attempts. Manufacturers even appear to cheat on
regulators’ product tests, providing customers with products they prefer
in tacit collusion. Reynaert and Sallee showed strong evidence that such
consumer-producer collusive cheating has occurred in the European car
market. Preventing such regulatory evasion requires regulators to
participate in an arms race or a red queen’s game with consumers and
producers, including ever more products within their regulatory ambit
and improving testing regimes, only for producers and consumers to
find new ways to evade. This, too, drives up the administrative cost of
regulations, perhaps substantially. It also causes collateral damage, with
“dual use” products like kerosene cans (and possibly water cans in the
future) regulated to prevent evasion of gas can rules despite having little
or no environmental impact when used for their intended purpose.
Finally, many consumers resent regulation that limits their choices or
forces design changes, apparently to a greater degree than they resent
regulation that merely increases the cost of end products. At times, this
discontent can be out of all proportion to the apparent inconvenience
imposed by the regulation. Legislation largely phasing out incandescent
light bulbs inspired significant popular backlash, despite the fact that
replacement bulbs had a lower cost of ownership. Gas can regulations
have inspired similar discontent, albeit at a lower profile. Paradoxically,
however, vehicle emissions standards do not seem to have inspired
widespread or deep consumer discontent, despite their large cost and
large effects on vehicle design. It appears to be regulations that ban (or
are viewed as banning) existing, familiar products that cause particular
discontent among consumers.
Such discontent ultimately undermines regulators’ credibility and
political capital, again out of proportion to the predicted benefits of the
regulation. In other words, at least some consumer-facing rules risk
damaging regulators’ “social license to regulate” in a way that industryfacing rules that raise costs ultimately borne by consumers do not.
Regulators should, therefore, more carefully consider the additional
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administrative and political costs of consumer-facing regulation. As a
first cut, attempting to estimate these costs (or estimate them better than
current regulators) and include them in cost-benefit analyses is likely to
lead to better decision-making. Doing so may sometimes lead regulators
to reject otherwise-appealing consumer-facing regulation, perhaps in
favor of superficially more costly regulation of firms.
However, such shifts in regulatory target are not the only option
available to regulators. Shifting to more flexible regulatory tools such as
performance standards and externality pricing may reduce or, in a few
cases, eliminate consumer incentives to evade regulation or collude with
producers to do so, and can preserve consumer choice, thereby
preventing the most serious consumer discontent. That said, regulators
have already moved strongly toward more flexible regulation without
eliminating the problems with consumer-facing regulation discussed
above.
Other options include changing the compliance point of regulation
(e.g., from products to fuels) or targeting aspects of products that affect
only price, not the consumer experience (like gas can vapor permeability
rather than spout design). More broadly, regulators should consider
whether
research
and
development
subsidies,
consumer
information/labeling campaigns, or “green default” rules might be more
effective than direct consumer-facing regulation.
In short, regulators should take a broader view than they have in the
past, and take consumers as they are, including their irrationality,
bounded rationality, and occasional overreactions. Regulators should
also recognize that they have limited ability to measure and appreciate
the costs their regulations impose on consumers, who may find it more
difficult than typical regulated firms to change their habits and
preferences. Integrating this awareness into regulatory design choices is
likely to lead to more better outcomes, not only in the form of more
cost-effective regulation but also in a more secure social license to
regulate.
To put it as simply as possible, regulations with direct effects on
consumers both create disproportionate political opposition and
opportunities for consumers to evade them, sometimes in collusion with
industry. These factors should receive greater consideration in policy
design, likely leading to selection of different regulatory tools and/or
targets.
Regulation is not a goal in and of itself, but rather a means to achieve
socially beneficial goals, such as an appropriate balance between
environmental protection and economic growth. Where to set that
balance is a political choice. Consumers are citizens, and it is ultimately
they who decide what level of regulatory protection from environmental
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or other harms they want government to supply. If regulators are
perceived as ineffective or overbearing, citizens are likely to constrain
or eliminate them, choosing a lesser degree of protection from
externalities than they would ideally prefer were regulators perceived to
be effective. Consumer-facing regulation appears to play a
disproportionate role in citizen views on regulators, perhaps
unsurprisingly. Regulators should therefore consider such regulation
more carefully.
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